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INTRODUCTION
Alcoholic intoxication is a problem with which American society has
been grappling for more than a century. It is estimated that nearly
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111 million Americans drink alcohol.1 Given the prevalence of
alcohol use and its connections with crime and violence,2 it is not
surprising that the legal system constantly struggles with the issues
raised by intoxication. The most heated debate among legal scholars
concerns the relevance of intoxication to the mens rea elements in
criminal offenses.' Legislatures and courts have debated the validity
1. See Katherine Prescott, Drawing Line Against Underage Drinking, STAR TRIB., Sept. 16,
1996, at H1A. Of these 111 million alcohol users, more than ten million are alcoholics. See
generally Note, Alcohol Abuse and the Law, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1660 (1981) (discussing changes in
law prompted by pervasiveness of alcohol abuse).
2. See Note, supra note 1, at 1681-82 (noting that approximately 50% of homicides
committed involve both attackers and victims who were under the influence of alcohol at least
partially). A number of studies have detailed the correlation between alcohol and violent crime.
Professor Nemerson provided a small sample of these statistics:
Of 882 felons arrested in a two-year period in Cincinnati, 64 percent had a urine
alcohol level of 0.10 percent or higher. In crimes of violence, the incidence varied
from 67 to 88 percent. A four-year study of 588 homicide cases in Philadelphia
revealed that one or both parties had been drinking in 64 percent of the cases. In 44
percent of these cases, both parties had been drinking.
Steven S. Nemerson, Alcoholism, Intoxication, and the Criminal Law, 10 CARDozo L. REv. 393, 446
n.214 (1988) (citing Moore, Legal Responsibility and ChronicAcoholism, 122 AM.J. PSYCHIATmY 748,
753 (1966)). These studies have led to the conclusion that alcohol abuse is more common
among felons convicted of violent crimes than among the general population or convicted
felons as a whole. See Note, supra note 1, at 1682 (citing FRANK P. GRAD ET AL., ALCOHOLISM
AND THE LAW 2 (1971); Donald W. Goodwin et al., Felons Who Drink: An 8-YearFollow-Up, 32 Q.J.
STUD. ALCOHOL 136, 139 (1971)). The connection between alcohol and violence is rooted in
the basic inhibitory affects that alcohol has on the central nervous system. It is well established
that alcohol decreases an individual's self-control and inhibitions. See Nemerson, supra, at 416
(asserting that suppressive effects of alcohol on one's reasoningjudgement, morals, conscience,
and other cognitive abilities is well documented). This theory suggests that an individual will
do things after drinking alcohol that they normally would not. See Monrad G. Paulsen,
Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1961 CURRENT PROBS. IN CRIM. L. 1, 1 (arguing that "a person
changes his personality to some extent" after drinking). In this respect, the physiological effects
of alcohol can lead to criminal activity regardless of the individual's intentions prior to drinking.
See i.
A variation on this direct causation theory is that alcohol does not cause crime, but rather
contributes to it. See Note, supra note 1, at 1682. Such is the case with the individual who
drinks to alleviate nerves after deciding to commit a crime. See id. Thus, alcohol has no role
in forming the criminal intent, but provides the necessary courage to manifest it. The fact that
not everyone who becomes intoxicated commits a crime suggests that this view has some validity.
See id. Justice Scalia took this theory a step further in Montana v. Egelhoff arguing that
intoxicated individuals act violently not due to biology, but because society has been taught that
intoxicated persons act violently as a matter of fact. See 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2021 (1996) (plurality
opinion).
3. Seegenerally Note, supra note 1 (providing overview of various debates regarding alcohol
abuse). It is widely believed that the law has been slow in adapting to developments in the
understanding of alcohol and its affects on humans. See id. at 1661; see also Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct.
at 2030 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (characterizing changes in doctrine forbidding voluntary
intoxication evidence as "slow progress typical of the common law"). Despite its slow evolution,
the law among the states concerning intoxication evidence and mens rea is fairly consistent,
contrary to Justice Scalia's characterization that the law is in a state of flux. See Egelhoff, 116 S.
Ct. at 2021 (plurality opinion) (holding that use of intoxication evidence in determining mens
rea "has not received sufficiently uniform and permanent allegiance"). Involuntary intoxication
is a complete defense, excusing the commission of the crime. Such instances, however, are
extremely rare. Professor Hall argues thatjudgments of guilt in instances of fraud and coercion
have all but eliminated the concept of involuntary intoxication. SeeJerome Hall, Intoxication and
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and necessity of allowing defendants to submit to juries the defense
that alcohol prevented the defendant from possessing the required
mental elements of the offense charged.4
A corollary to this debate is the repeated allusion by the U.S.
Supreme Court to the right of a defendant to present a defense in a
Criminal Responsibility, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1056 (1944) ("As regards 'coercion,' the case-law
implies that a person would need to be bound head and foot, and the liquor literally poured
down his throat... before the exception, so universally voiced, would have any effect ofjudicial
decision.").
The law on voluntary intoxication defenses is less settled. Some commentators argue that
voluntary intoxication never should excuse a crime. See Paulsen, supra note 2, at 2-3 (stating
judicial and legislative belief that voluntary intoxication cannot excuse crime). One author
writes that allowing a broad voluntary intoxication defense will fail to serve society's interest in
safety and will not deter similar actions in the future. SeeNote, supra note 1, at 1685 (expressing
need to avoid frivolous intoxication claims). Critics are fairly uniform, however, in their
agreement that the failure to consider voluntary intoxication evidence in any respect is too
restrictive to prove rational. Although drunkenness may deserve moral outrage, getting drunk
is not in itself a crime. See Note, supra note 1, at 1686; see also Arthur A. Murphy, Has
Pennsylvania Found a Satisfactory Intoxication Defense?, 81 DIGm. L. REv. 199,204-05 (1977) (arguing
that because alcohol can affect ability to form intent, conviction without consideration of
intoxication may punish defendant severely for "relatively minor delict of getting drunk"). More
importantly, intoxication may prevent the accused from forming the required intent, raising
serious questions about his culpability. Scholars cite the need to balance the potential for
massive numbers of defendants who will be permitted to commit crimes while intoxicated with
the realization that alcohol plays a role in crime and criminal intent. See Note, supra note 1, at
1686 (arguing that limitation of intoxication evidence in defense will avoid such abuses); see also
supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing interplay of alcohol and crime).
The compromise is the commonly followed practice of allowing evidence of voluntary
intoxication when the defendant argues that he did not possess the mens rea necessary to be
guilty of the crime. SeeMurphy, supra, at 199-200 ("The great majority of American jurisdictions
follow what may be characterized as a 'capacity defense' approach to the defense of voluntary
intoxication."). Within this middle ground, most courts draw additional lines between general
and specific intent. See generally FrankJ. Remington & Orrin L. Hestad, The Mental Element in
Crime--A Legislative Problem, 1952 Wis. L. REV. 644 (providing detailed description of general and
specific intent and its role in criminal justice system). Voluntary intoxication usually cannot be
considered if the crime is one of general intent. See Paulsen, supra note 2, at 9. In these
situations, it is presumed that the intent is manifested by engaging in the illegal activity.
Intoxication is relevant only if the crime is a specific intent crime; there must be a general intent
to commit an act with additional intent to commit other crimes. An example of a specific intent
crime is burglary, which requires intent to enter the property of another with the intent to take
his possessions. Most critics assail the specific/general intent distinction as irrelevant and empty.
See2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 111, at 104-05 (15th ed. 1995) (indicating
that distinction is "difficult to perceive"). Critics claim that the relevant inquiry is whether the
defendant has formed the intent to commit a crime, whether general or specific. Sep e.g.,
Edward H. Benton et al., Special Project: Drugs, 33 VAND. L. 1Ev. 1145, 1176 (1980) ("[T]he...
logical view is to admit evidence of intoxication in all cases in which intent, whether general or
specific, is an element of the crime."); Nemerson, supra note 2, at 423 ("This doctrinal approach
is wrong in principle."); Note, supra note 1, at 1684 ("Both general and specific intent crimes
require a particular intent."); Scott A. Anderegg, Note, The Voluntary Intoxication Defense in Iowa,
73 IoWA L. REV. 935, 955 (1988) (asserting that it is logical to allow intoxication to negate both
general and specific intent crimes). Whether intent is labelled "specific" or "general," if
intoxication negates the requisite element of intention, then the crime has not been committed.
Conditioning guilt on an extra mens rea term avoids addressing the real issue: "what the legal
significance of drunkenness should be." Note, supra note 1, at 1684 (asserting that reliance on
general and specific intent is unsound).
4. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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criminal trial under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as established in Chambers v. Mississippi.5 In Montana v.
Egelhoff6 the Court addressed what role this right played in the
controversy surrounding the relevancy of voluntary intoxication to
considerations of mens rea. In Egelhoff, the Court confronted a due
process challenge to a Montana law forbidding consideration of
intoxication evidence in homicide offenses.' In a 5-4 decision, the
Court refused to rule that this evidentiary restriction was a due
process violation.' Although the Court acknowledged the existence
of the right to present a defense, it held that the combination of the
deference accorded to states in instituting their criminal justice
systems and the long common-law tradition of excluding intoxication
evidence justified the restriction.9
Egelhoff s effect on the right to present a defense doctrine is
unclear. Because the plurality appears to have been motivated by the
moral nature of the alcohol issue, Egelhoffmay prove to be a decision
limited to its facts. Still, the role that Egelhoff plays in the emerging
right to present a defense doctrine is worth examining and is the
focus of this Note.
Part I of this Note discusses the genesis of the right to present a
defense leading to Montana v. Egelhoff Part II summarizes the factual
and procedural background of the case, and Part III presents the
Supreme Court's opinions. Part IV analyzes the Egelhoff decision and
suggests that its effect on the right to present a defense will be
limited. Finally, Part V offers recommendations on the role that
Montana v. Egeihoff should play in the law.
5. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
6. 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996) (plurality opinion), revg900 P.2d 260 (Mont. 1995).
7. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1995). This section states:
A person who is in an intoxicated condition is criminally responsible for his conduct
and an intoxicated condition is not a defense to any offense and may not be taken into
consideration in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of
the offense unless the defendant proves that he did not know that it was an
intoxicating substance.
Id.
8. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (plurality opinion).
9. See id. at 2023-24 (plurality opinion).
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I. HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE' 0
A. Case Law Leading to Chambers v. Mississippi
In 1851 the Supreme Court first addressed the exclusion of a
defendant's evidence in United States v. Reid." Reid, like many of the
Court's first examinations of exclusions, relied on evidentiary and
procedural grounds instead of constitutional principles. 2 The most
important of these first "evidentiary approach" cases was Crawford v.
United States.'3 By invalidating the exclusion of a letter supporting
the defendant's defense in a conspiracy trial, the Court expressed a
concern that the defendant receive a fair trial and that part of such
assurance included allowing the defendant to present relevant
evidence.' 4
The Court began to recognize a due process right to present a
defense in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Beginning in the context
of civil trials, the Court started to acknowledge a general right to be
heard in defense and intimated that this right was fundamental."5
10. See genera/y Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional
Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. RMV. 711 (1976) (detailing history of right to present a
defense). The history of the right to a defense is a long and complex one, and it is not the
intention of this Note to provide a thorough examination of its growth. Rather, Part I of this
Note seeks to sketch the general treatment of the right by the Supreme Court.
11. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851), overruled by Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918).
Reid involved the appeal of a murder conviction and the exclusion of an accomplice's testimony
on behalf of the defendant on trial. The ultimate rejection of the appeal was based on an
interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and did not implicate constitutional principles. See
United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 365-66 (1851); Clinton, supra note 10, at 742-44.
In Rosen, the Court specifically overruled Red. See Rosen, 245 U.S. at 470-71. There the Court
also was concerned with witness exclusion issues. Recognizing a growing shift toward erring on
the side of permitting relevant testimony, the Court approved the trial court's admission of
testimony by a witness who had been convicted of forgery. Most importantly, the opinion
expressed the notion that arriving at the truth is served best by allowing pertinent and reliable
evidence and then allowing the jury to decide the importance of testimony. See id at 471.
12. See Clinton, supra note 10, at 747. Professor Clinton explains that the Supreme Court's
failure to address the constitutional significance of evidentiary exclusions was a result of how the
Court came to hear the cases in the first instance. See id. Until approximately 1920, many of
the evidence cases were heard by the Court as writ of error appeals to the lower courts. See id
Because the Supreme Court has supervisory power over the lower courts, it was unnecessary to
approach the appeals from a constitutional standpoint. See id.
13. 212 U.S. 183 (1909). "[Tihe strongest early statement by the Court regarding the
exclusion ofportions of the defense's evidence came in Crawford v. United States." Clinton, supra
note 10, at 746.
14. See Clinton, supra note 10, at 747 (arguing that tone of decision emits concern for fair
trial).
15. See, e.g., Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 417 (1897) (asserting that right to be heard in
one's defense was a fundamental right under due process); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274,
277 (1876) ("A sentence of a court pronounced against a party without hearing him, or giving
him an opportunity to be heard, is not ajudicial determination of his rights, and is not entitled
to respect in any other tribunal."); McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 259,267 (1870)
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The first significant statement of these principles in a criminal case
came with Cooke v. United States,16 and continued in In re Oliver.7
These cases, however, were minor steps toward constitutional
protection for the right to present a defense because they involved
the outright denial of hearings for defendants and were clear
examples of due process violations.1
8
The important discussion of the right to a defense in situations in
which the defendant's evidence was excluded only partially would not
come until the late 1960s. 19 Although confronted with numerous
cases involving partial exclusions of evidence, 0 the Court did not
contribute significantly to the development of the due process right
to a defense in these situations21 until 1969 with Jenkins v.
McKeithen.22 In Jenkins, the Court addressed a Louisiana statute
creating the Louisiana Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry."8
The Supreme Court held that the Commission functioned as a
(holding that social and judicial principles mandate that accused be given hearing).
16. 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
17. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
18. See Clinton, supra note 10, at 751 (arguing that Cookeand Oliver touch only superficially
on right to a defense and that greater concern is Court's application of right to a defense in
cases where defendant was denied right to present a defense only partially). Both Cooke and
Oliver involved cases in which the trial judge convicted the defendant of contempt without
affording the defendant the right to present a defense. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517,
537 (1925); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 258 (1948).
19. See Clinton, supra note 10, at 752-56. Professor Clinton laments that the Court had
opportunities in cases such as Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), to apply the
constitutional right to a defense in the partial exclusion situation. Yakus concerned evidence
restrictions under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 418. Chief
Justice Stone, writing for the majority, accepted the notion that due process affords a defendant
the "reasonable opportunity to be heard and present evidence." Id. at 433. Stone, however, felt
that the opportunity had been given to the defendant prior to the criminal trial, and therefore,
found no due process violation at that level. See id. at 434 (stating that in light of defendant's
failure to assert a right to an available administrative remedy, the adequacy of administrative
procedures was not an issue ripe for review).
20. See, eg., Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (analyzing Colorado Sex Offenders
Act that allowed for an increased sentence of a convicted sex offender if the judge felt that the
accused was a threat to society); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (addressing Texas
statute prohibiting testimony of one participant on behalf of another participant); Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961) (addressing Georgia rule forbidding defendant from giving sworn
testimony but allowing defendant to give statement to court).
21. See, e.g., Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 596 (grounding unconstitutionality of statute in right to
counsel); Clinton, supra note 10, at 764 (arguing that invalidation of law under due process in
Specht did not contribute to growth of right to defense doctrine because, as in Cooke and Oliver,
defendant was denied any evidence); see also supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text
(describing cases in which Court started to acknowledge right to be heard in defense).
22. 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
23. SeeJenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 413-14 (1969) (stating purpose of Commission
included investigating and finding facts "relating to violations or possible violations of criminal
laws of the state of Louisiana").
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criminal enforcement body24 and, as such, was subject to the
requirements placed on states by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' Justice Marshall wrote in the majority
opinion that these rights included "the right of a person investigated
to present evidence on his own behalf."26  Although Jenkins added
significant weight to the concept of a right to a defense, the Court's
opinion failed to explain the test for determining if an evidentiary
exclusion violated this right.2
7
The most significant development of the right to a defense doctrine
occurred in the early 1970s. In Webb v. Texas,23 the Court heard a
case involving a claim that the defendant's due process rights were
violated when the trial judge harassed and threatened the defendant's
only witness to the point that the witness refused to testify.29 The
Court overturned the defendant's conviction on the grounds that the
judge's actions violated the defendant's due process right to present
a defense."0 This decision was ground-breaking in the jurisprudence
24. See id at 427-28. The Court cited numerous reasons for finding that the Commission
functioned as a criminal adjudicatory body: (1) the scope of the inquiries was limited to
criminal law violations; (2) the Commission did not have civil jurisdiction; (3) the Commission
had the power to compel the attendance of witnesses; and (4) the Commission could conduct
public hearings. See i&L at 415-18.
25. See id. at 428 (finding procedures of Commission insufficient to satisfy due process
requirements because no provision was made for accused to confront and cross-examine
witnesses).
26. 1& at 429 (noting the Commission's procedures drastically limited right to present
evidence on defendant's own behalf).
27. See Clinton, supra note 10, at 771; see also Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 606 (1972)
(addressing a Tennessee statutory requirement that a defendant testify before any other
testimony is presented to the court). The Court in Brooks found a statutory requirement that
the defendant testify unconstitutional because it violated the defendant's right against self-
incrimination. The Court's decision, however, adopted a test that balanced the state interest
in making the defendant testify first against an infringement on his Fifth Amendment rights.
See id. at 609-12. Professor Clinton argues that ifJustice Brennan simply had utilized the Due
Process Clause right to a defense instead of a "strained self-incrimination privilege analysis," the
Court would have established a much needed analytical test in the right to present a defense.
See Clinton, supra note 10, at 776.
28. 409 U.S. 95 (1972).
29. See Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 95-97 (1972). The witness in question was himself in
jail at the time of the trial. See id. at 95. Apparently concerned with the reliability of such a
witness, the judge issued the following warning:
Now you have been called down as a witness in this case by the Defendant. It is the
Court's duty to admonish you that you don't have to testify, that anything you say can
and will be used against you. If you take the witness stand and lie under oath, the
Court will personally see that your case goes to the grandjury and you will be indicted
for perjury and the liklihood [sic] is that you would get convicted of perjury and that
it would be stacked onto what you have already got, so that is the matter you have got
to make up your mind on.
I& at 95-96. The Court disagreed with the lower courts, stating that the warning evinced a clear
expectation on the part of the judge that the witness would lie and that the tone of his
statement was such that it could be expected to intimidate the witness. See id. at 97-98.
30. See id. at 98.
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of the right to present a defense because the Court's reasoning relied
on the Due Process Clause and not on the Compulsory Process Clause
of the Sixth Amendment as had been the trend.3
Until 1970, the Court slowly had begun to craft the right to present
a defense and, with Webb, had indicated that such a right was found
in the Due Process Clause. In 1973, the Court took the final step in
the genesis of this right when it heard Chambers v. Mississippi.1
2
Chambers was the cornerstone decision in the foundation of the due
process right of a criminal defendant to present a defense.33 The
defendant in Chambers was convicted of murdering a police officer.3 4
At issue was the application of Mississippi's voucher and hearsay rules,
which led to the exclusion of important defense evidence. 5 The
31. See Clinton, supra note 10, at 779. The language utilized in Webb was taken from
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). In Washington, the Court found that a Texas statute
forbidding the testimony of criminal participants in the defense of each other was unconstitu-
tional as a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to have compulsory process for
obtaining favorable witnesses. See id Professor Clinton writes that the Court's use of language
from Washington, although relying on the Fourteenth Amendment in Webb, is significant because
the situation in Webb was probably a more egregious violation of the compulsory process than
that present in Washington. See Clinton, supra note 10, at 779. More specifically, the defendant
in Washington was denied the testimony of a witness, whereas the witness in Webb was the only
witness. See id. As such, Professor Clinton indicates that the Webb decision might signal the
Court's willingness to rely "on an elastic due process analysis." Id. at 778. Such an argument
must be tempered with Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972), a companion case to Webb. At
issue in Cool was a jury instruction concerning the testimony of one of the defendant's
accomplices. See id. at 100. The judge's instruction, in the view of the Court, implied that the
jury should throw out the testimony unless it considered the testimony valid "beyond a
reasonable doubt." See id. at 102. The Court held that the instruction violated Cool's guarantee
to compulsory process by obstructing the exercise of the rights intimated in Washington. See id.
at 104. It would seem that the facts in Coolare less amenable to a compulsory process standard
than Webb, yet the Court used the Sixth Amendment in Cool but not in Webb. See Clinton, supra
note 10, at 781. This fact weakens the statement that Webb signaled a shift to reliance on the
Due Process Clause in evidentiary exclusions. Professor Westen argues that the right to present
a defense would be founded best on the compulsory process guarantees of the Sixth Amend-
ment, a proposition he supports with reference to the Constitution and its history. See Peter
Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71, 182-84 (1974). Professor Clinton
counters that such a grounding unnecessarily would require finding the right to a defense in
the penumbra of the Sixth Amendment. See Clinton, supra note 10, at 781-83. Professor Clinton
suggests that the inherent flexibility of the Due Process Clause allows the doctrine to mature on
its own terms rather than according to the restrictive phrasing of the Sixth Amendment. See id.
The Supreme Court appears to agree with Professor Clinton, as it has moved toward grounding
the right to present a defense in the Due Process Clause. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284 (1973).
32. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
33. See Stephen G. Churchwell, The Constitutional Right to Present Evidence: Progeny of
Chambers v. Mississippi, 19 CRIM. L. ButL. 131, 131-32 (1983) (stating that Chambers has led
Supreme Court to limit exclusion of evidence based on a defendant's due process rights);
Clinton, supra note 10, at 787.
34. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 285.
35. See id. at 294 (discussing effect of application of voucher and hearsay rules by trial
judge). The facts of Chambers are long and complicated. The story begins on June 14, 1969,
when two officers from the Woodville, Mississippi, Police Department attempted to effect a
warrant for the arrest of C.C. Jackson. Jackson resisted and was aided by at least 50 persons.
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Court held 8-1 that these evidentiary exclusions violated the
defendant's Due Process Clause rights,36 which included "the right
to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations."37
Justice Powell's "limitation clause," which stated that the holding in
Chambers did nothing to create "new principles of constitutional law,"
tempered the seemingly unequivocal statement that Due Process
Other officers arrived and their attempt to arrestJackson led to the firing of five or six shots.
One of the original arresting officers, Aaron Liberty, was shot and killed. Before dying, Liberty
was able to fire some shots toward what many believed to be the area of the gunman. The
second shot hit Leon Chambers. The police attended to Liberty, believing Chambers dead.
Chambers, however, was alive and sometime later was taken to the hospital by three friends.
The police placed Chambers under guard at the hospital and charged him with the murder of
Officer Liberty. The controversy in the case surrounded one of Chambers' friends, Gable
McDonald. McDonald was present in the crowd on June 14 and was a part of the group who
took Chambers to the hospital. In November, McDonald confessed to Chamber's attorney that
he had killed Liberty with his own .22-caliber revolver and that he had told another friend that
he shot Liberty. McDonald submitted to the attorney that his confession was voluntary.
McDonald then was taken into custody. A month later, McDonald recanted his confession. He
said that another friend had convinced him to confess, promising him that he would not go to
jail and could reap some of the profits that Chambers would receive in a suit against the City
of Woodville. His new story was that he was not at the scene but came later when he and a
friend, who were having a beer down the street, heard the shots. There they found Chambers,
and he and other friends took Chambers to the hospital. He also maintained that he had
owned a .22, but that it had not been in his possession for some time. Chambers, among other
things, asserted at trial that McDonald had killed Liberty. One witness testified that he saw
McDonald shoot Liberty, and another testified that he saw McDonald after the shooting with
a gun in his hand. Chambers also attempted to show that McDonald had confessed numerous
times to the shooting, but that "he was thwarted in his attempt to present this portion of his
defense by the strict application of certain Mississippi rules of evidence:' First, Chambers was
denied an opportunity to examine McDonald as an adverse witness. The trial judge held that
McDonald was "hostile" but not "adverse in the sense of the word." Chambers then attempted
to admit the testimony of three witnesses to whom McDonald had confessed. All three were
denied under the hearsay rule. The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld all four exclusions.
Chambers appealed, claiming that these exclusions made his trial fundamentally unfair and
violated his due process rights. See i&. at 285-94.
36. See id. at 303
37. Id, at 294 (holding that hearsay and voucher exclusions prevented Chambers from
receiving a fair opportunity to defend). The Court, in an opinion written byJustice Powell, first
examined the trial court's refusal to allow a cross-examination of McDonald. The Court stated
that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness is essential in ensuring that the
truth-finding role of the trial is performed. See id. at 295 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
405 (1965)). Thus, the reasoning justifying the denial of this right must be scrutinized. See id.
at 295. In this case, the State attempted to justify the restriction on the grounds that McDonald
was not adverse in that he had not fingered Chambers as the gunman. See id. at 297. The Court
rejected this argument as a technicality, hypothesizing that McDonald's confessions and
subsequent retractions tended to exculpate and then incriminate Chambers. See id Thus, the
denial of cross-examination "plainly interfered with Chambers' right to defend against the State's
charges." Id. at 298. The Court then turned to the trial court's refusal to allow the testimony
of the three witnesses to whom McDonald had confessed. The Court stated that the right to
present witnesses in one's defense is fundamental. See id at 302 (citing Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S.
95 (1972); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)). Under
this premise, a hearsay rule should not be applied "mechanistically" when the testimony appears
to be reliable and is essential to the defense. See id The Court concluded that the combination
of forbidding a cross-examination of McDonald by the defense and the exclusion of three
reliable and pertinent witnesses amounted to a violation of Chamber's due process rights. See
i& at 302-03.
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Clause protections include the right to present a defense.' The
significance of this statement still is debated in the courts," but most
judges and legal scholars agree that the Court in Chambers clearly
based its holding on the due process right of a criminal defendant to
present a defense.4"
B. The Right to Present a Defense After Chambers v. Mississippi
Since Chambers, the Supreme Court has continued to invoke the
right to a defense under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and consequently, the right to a defense has become a
fundamental principle of law.41 Substantial reliance on this right,
however, has been sparse. The Court's first noteworthy use of the
right to present a defense came in California v. Trombetta,42 in which
the Court addressed whether states were required under the Due
Process Clause to preserve potentially important evidence for a
defendant.4" Although a unanimous Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not require a state to save such evidence," it was
clear in recognizing the right of the defendant to present an adequate
defense: "Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
38. See id. at 302. Justice Powell wrote:
In reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor
does our holding signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to the
States in the establishment and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and
procedures. Rather, we hold quite simply that under the facts and circumstances of
this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial.
Id. at 302-03. Some critics have argued that this statement is modest and misplaced. See, e.g.,
Note, State v. Gremillion: The Constitutional and Evidentiary Elasticity of the Louisiana Residual
Hearsay Exception in Criminal Cases, 50 LA. L. REv. 845, 855 (1990) (stating that Chambers
established new constitutional principles). Professor Clinton submits that the decision broke
ground in three ways. First, when viewed in conjunction with Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972),
the Court had rested a defendant's right solidly on the Due Process Clause instead of on
another constitutional principle. See Clinton, supra note 10, at 791. Second, Chambers involved
the partial restriction on a defendant's testimony. See id. Third, because the confession was
submitted to the jury, Chambers "represents the first case in which the right to defend has been
applied to arguably cumulative, albeit critical, defense testimony." Id. at 791-92.
39. See Churchwell, supra note 33, at 138 (noting trend in courts to use Chambers' principle
in expansion of defendant's due process rights); see also infra Part .B (examining right to
present a defense after Chambers).
40. See Clinton, supra note 10, at 792.
41. See, ag., Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2031 (1996) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(labeling right to present a defense as fundamental); United States v. Perkins, 937 F.2d 1397,
1401 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The right to present a defense is clearly fundamental...
42. 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
43. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 481 (1984). Each of the respondents in the
case were appealing drunk driving convictions on the grounds that had the state saved the
breath samples on which the determination was made that they were drunk, they would have
been able to impeach the evidence. See id. at 482-83.
44. See id. at 491 (holding that Due Process Clause does not require states to "preserve
breath samples" for purpose of introducing such as evidence).
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ment, criminal prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of
fundamental fairness. We have long interpreted this standard of
fairness to require that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense."' This statement seems
to equate the right to a defense, as defined in Chambers, with
fundamental fairness, bolstering the right to present a defense
doctrine and casting doubt on the validity ofJustice Powell's "limita-
tion clause" in Chambers.46
The most substantial Supreme Court case to invoke the right to
present a defense was Crane v. Kentucky.47 In Crane the Court
addressed the exclusion of testimony pertaining to the circumstances
of the defendant's confession.4" The Court, in what has amounted
to the strongest statement ever by the Court of this doctrine, held
that the exclusion denied Crane the "fundamental constitutional right
to a fair opportunity to present a defense,"49 as found in the Due
Process Clause." The evidentiary restriction could not be sustained
because "competent, relevant evidence" can be excluded only if there
is a valid state justification, which was not present in this case.51 In
an apparent attempt to nullify the applicability of Justice Powell's
"limitation clause" in Chambers, the Court wrote, "We break no new
45. Id. at 485.
46. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) ("In reaching this judgment, we
establish no new principles of constitutional law."); see also supra note 38 and accompanying text
(detailing context and relevance of Justice Powell's statement).
47. 476 U.S. 683 (1986). Crane was not the first post-Chambers case to cite the right to
present a defense principle. See, e.g., Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 583 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 687 (1986). The defendant was being questioned
as to possible involvement in another crime when he suddenly began confessing to various
crimes. See id& at 684. The police took him to the station and obtained a confession for the
murder in question. The defendant attempted to suppress the confession as a violation of his
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and was denied. Attempts by the defendant at trial to
submit evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the interrogations were excluded by the
judge. The defendant appealed, claiming the exclusion was a violation of his rights under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 684-86.
49. Id. at 687 (citing Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485).
50. See id. The Court held that the right to present a defense was grounded in the Due
Process Clause after Chambers. See id. at 690; see also Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 343 (1993)
(noting due process protection of opportunity to present a defense in cases involving evidentiary
restrictions (citing Crane 476 U.S. at 690; Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485; Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973))); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 423 (1988) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (stating
that Due Process Clause affords protection of right to present relevant defense evidence); Rock
v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987) (articulating that right to testify is protected under Due
Process Clause).
51. See Crane, 476 U.S. at 690. The Court adopted the Chambers test of weighing the
interests of the state in applying or adopting its evidentiary standards against the limitation that
the rule places on the right of the defendant to present an adequate defense. See id.; see also
Rock, 483 U.S. at 61 ("A State's legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does not
extend to perse exclusions that may be reliable in an individual case.").
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ground in observing that an essential component of procedural
fairness is an opportunity to be heard."52 The opinion also indicated
that the right to present a defense assured that the prosecutor's case
was subjected to "adversarial testing." 3
A survey of Supreme Court cases since Chambers reveals that the
right to present a defense has proved durable and gained widespread
acceptance. 54 A survey of cases in the United States Circuit Courts
reveals a similar endorsement.55 For example, the Second Circuit in
Williams v. Lord5' adopted the right to present a defense doctrine
when considering the exclusion of evidence.57  In that case, the
court was deciding whether the defendant, in support of her
self-defense claim, had the right to introduce evidence that the victim
had a history of violent activity.58 The defendant maintained that
52. Crane, 476 U.S. at 690.
53. Id. at 690-91; cf Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1988) (grounding right to
present evidence and to establish a defense in Sixth Amendment and Compulsory Process
Clause). In Taylor, the Court wrote that the right to develop a defense through a presentation
of relevant facts assured that the adversarial system ofjustice functioned properly and that such
a right therefore was fundamental. See id at 408-09 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
719 (1974)).
54. See, e.g., Gilmore, 508 U.S. at 343, Taylor, 484 U.S. at 423 (Brennan,J., dissenting); Rock,
483 U.S. at 51; Crane, 476 U.S. at 690; Trombeita, 467 U.S. at 485; Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1992) (denying
crucial and reliable evidence is due process violation of right to complete defense); United
States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 154 (4th Cir. 1990) (grounding fundamental right to present
a defense in Due Process Clause (citing Crane, 476 U.S. at 690; Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302;
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967))); Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1515 (11th Cir.
1990) (acknowledging due process restrictions on exclusion of evidence); Ferreira v. Fair, 732
F.2d 245, 248 (1st Cir. 1984) (stating that evidentiary restriction can amount to "deprivation of
due process" (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 298)); Trussell v. Estelle, 699 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir.
1983) (indicating that exclusion of crucial evidence raised due process concerns); Virgin Islands
v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 970 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that Supreme Court has recognized "due
process right to present an effective defense"); Conner v. Auger, 595 F.2d 407, 411 (8th Cir.
1979) (citing Chambed holding that due process guarantees right to present relevant evidence
in defense); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978) (finding due process
right to present "clearly exculpatory evidence"); cf. Johnson v. Chrans, 844 F.2d 482, 484 (7th
Cir. 1988) (intimating that right to present evidence, even relevant and competent exculpatory
evidence, can be superseded by legitimate state justifications).
56. 996 F.2d 1481 (2d Cir. 1993).
57. See Williams v. Lord, 996 F.2d 1481, 1483-84 (2d Cir. 1993).
58. See id. at 1482. Williams was on trial for murder and weapons charges in the death of
John Neil Bennett. At trial, Williams argued that Bennett's death was the result of self-defense.
Bennett had paid Williams, who was a prostitute, to have oral sex. Williams claimed that
Bennett smoked crack and became violent, grabbing her throat and cutting her with a knife.
She grabbed the knife, stabbed Bennett, and then ran, throwing the knife away. The testimony
at trial indicated that Williams had suffered no visible wounds and that there was no medical
evidence consistent with the presence of narcotics in Bennett's body. To support a weak
self-defense claim, Williams attempted to submit evidence that Bennett had a history of violent
sexual activity in light of a memo indicating a prior rape investigation. The trial court did not
allow the admission of the evidence and Williams was convicted. The New York Court of
Appeals denied her appeal that the exclusion of the evidence violated her right to present a
defense. She then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which granted her
petition. See id at 1481-83.
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her constitutionally protected right to present a defense mandated the
admission of the evidence.59 The court acknowledged that the right
to present a defense was rooted in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.60 Furthermore, the court determined that
the proper test for addressing this right was that applied in Rock v.
Arkansas. whether the interests in applying the evidentiary rule
justified the limitations on the right to present a defense.6' Al-
though the court concluded that the defendant's right to present a
defense had not been violated,62 its opinion is indicative of how
United States Courts of Appeal generally treat the right to present a
defense.63
In sum, these decisions lead to two concrete conclusions regarding
the right to present a defense. First, courts acknowledge that the
right to present a defense exists under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Second, the proper standard of inquiry is
to examine the rationale behind the evidentiary exclusion and to
determine if those reasons are substantial enough to justify an
infringement on the defendant's right to present a defense.
59. See id. at 1482 (arguing that court should err on side of admission given right to present
a defense (citing Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709; Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302)).
60. See id at 1483. The court wrote that although it was unclear whether the right to
present a defense was found in either the Due Process Clause or the Confrontation Clause of
Compulsory Process guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, it was clear that either could sustain
the right to present a defense. See id (citing Crane, 476 U.S. at 690). Other opinions by the
Second Circuit have been more definitive in holding that the Due Process Clause guarantees
the right to present a defense. See; e.g., Rosario v. Kuhlman, 839 F.2d 918, 924 (2d Cir. 1988)
(finding right to present a defense implicated in Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
61. See Williams, 996 F.2d at 1483-84 (applying balancing test as written in Rockv. Arkansas,
483 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1987)); see also Turpin v. Kassulke, 26 F.3d 1392, 1396 (6th Cir. 1994)
(noting that right to present evidence is limited by valid state justifications); United States v.
Almonte, 956 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (stating that evidentiary restrictions are
.constitutional if they 'serve legitimate interests in the criminal trial process' while not 'arbitrary
or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve' (quoting Rock 483 U.S. at
55-56)); United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that due
process is violated if there are not valid state reasons for exclusion); Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d
1494, 1501 (11th Cir. 1990) (writing that defendant's interest in presenting important evidence
is defeated by courts interest in speculation about guilt of third party);Johnson v. Chrans, 844
F.2d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 1988) (balancing relevant and competent evidence against state
justification for exclusionary rule); Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 974 (3d Cir. 1980)
(holding that grant of immunity should be given to witness when he or she can offer relevant
evidence and when there is no strongjustification for withholding immunity); Conner v. Auger,
595 F.2d 407, 411 (8th Cir. 1979) (balancing right to present evidence against state interest in
fairness and reliability); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978) (adopting
Chambers test of balancing importance of evidence with justifications for exclusion).
62. See Williams, 996 F.2d at 1484 (determining that goals furthered by exclusion and
irrelevance of evidence justified keeping evidence out of court).
63. See supra note 55 (citing Courts of Appeals' decisions holding that Constitution
guarantees right to present a defense).
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Important considerations in this standard of inquiry include the
relevance and reliability of the evidence in question.6
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF
MONTANA V. EGELiOFF
65
A. Facts and Procedure at the Trial Level
In early July 1992, James Allen Egelhoff and a friend went mush-
room picking in the Yaak region near Troy, Montana.6' Egelhoff
had no possessions with him except for clothing and a .38 caliber
handgun.' They encountered Roberta Pavola and John Christian-
son, who also were picking mushrooms in the area, and the four
became friendly.1 On July 12, 1992, Egelhoff, Pavola, and Christian-
son sold the mushrooms,- purchased beer, and went to a party in
Troy.69  The three drank at the party and then at bars until 9:00
p.m. when they left in Christianson's station wagon, with Christianson
driving, Pavola in the front seat, and Egelhoff in the back seat.7" At
approximately 9:20 p.m., Christianson and Egelhoff were seen at a
grocery store.71  Later that night, numerous drivers on Highway 2
reported seeing Christianson's station wagon driving erratically,
repeatedly weaving between the road and a side ditch.72 Sometime
after midnight, sheriff's officers responded to calls of a drunk driver
on Highway 2 and found Christianson's car in a ditch on the side of
the road. The officers found Christianson and Payola dead from
gunshot wounds to the head in the front seat and Egelhoff in the
back seat, yelling obscenities.h Egelhoff's gun was found on the
driver's side floorboard with four loaded rounds and two empty
casings lying beside it.74 The officers took Egelhoff into custody and
brought him to a nearby hospital in Libby.75 The officers charged
64. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 (stating that evidence must be "critical" and "trustworthy");
Turpin, 26 F.3d at 1396 (adopting reliability and relevance criteria of Chambers).
65. 900 P.2d 260 (Mont. 1995), reu'd, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996) (plurality opinion).
66. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 261 (Mont. 1995), rev'd 116 S. Ct 2013 (1996)
(plurality opinion).
67. See id. According to the Montana Supreme Court's opinion, Egelhoff took the gun
from the glove compartment of Christianson's car. See id. at 265.
68. See id. at 261.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 262.
71. See id.
72. See id. Testimony by law enforcement officials indicated that Christianson's car had
gone off the road in at least five locations. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
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Egelhoff with two counts of deliberate homicide, which provides that
a defendant is guilty if he acts "knowingly" or "purposely" in causing
the death of another human being.
76
At trial, Detective Gassett, who responded to the situation, testified
that Egelhoff was "intoxicated, combative and cursing profusely" in
the detective's presence.77 For the five or six hours that Gassett was
present at the scene, Egelhoff acted wildly and repeatedly needed to
be restrained.78 Despite Egelhoff's erratic behavior and a .36 blood
alcohol content ("BAG") ,7 he was able to kick a camera out of the
hand of a policeman."
At trial, Egelhoff maintained that he had little memory of the day's
events.8 ' He remembered being at the party while it was still
daylight and then later sitting on a hill with Christianson drinking
Black Velvet. 2 Egelhoff did not remember leaving the party, driving
in Christianson's car, shooting the gun, or kicking the camera out of
the officer's hand."5 Egelhoff also did not recall asking the ambu-
lance driver repeatedly, "Did you find him?" 4 Forensics testing
revealed that there was gunshot residue on Egelhoffs hands.8 5 The
State's firearms examiner testified that the bullet that killed Christian-
son could have come from "thousands of guns with characteristics like
Egelhoff s gun."8
6
Egelhoff asserted at trial:
[B] ecause [I] was found unconscious and suffering from intoxica-
tion measured at .36 one hour after being brought to the hospital,
76. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102(1) (a) (1995).
77. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d at 262.
78. See id.
79. See id. (noting that Egelhoff registered .36 BAG one hour after being brought to
hospital). Blood alcohol content ("BAG") is the term used to measure the ratio of alcohol to
parts of blood in one's blood stream. See Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, at App. A, Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996) (No. 95-566). Under this
standard, the .36 BAG seen in Egelhoff is def'med in the following manner:.
Above .30, the tier at which repsondent tested, most people are not in a position to
drink anymore. They are usually unconscious and will remain in a coma until the body
has disposed of enough alcohol so that the nerve centers controlling consciousness may
begin to function again. It is important to note that persons in this condition are near
the point of death and may die if left unattended.
Id. at 26. In light of this statement, it may be likely that Egelhoff was capable of very little, let
alone "knowingly" or "purposely" committing homicide.
80. See Egehoff, 900 P.2d at 262. Egelhoff's ability to kick the camera, combined with his
generally solid coordination, led Detectives Gassett and Bernall, the officer with the camera, to
express surprise at EgelhofFs BAC. See id.
81. See i.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. I& at 263.
85. See id. at 262.
86. Id.
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[my] level of intoxication precluded [me] from having driven the
car or undertaking the physical tasks necessary to have done what
the prosecution claimed [I] had done.8 7
Egelhoff claimed that he suffered from an alcohol-induced blackout
which led to his inability to remember the events of that day."8 Dr.
Clyde Knecht, who examined Egelhoff at the hospital, testified that
Egelhoff's behavior and .36 BAG supported the theory that Egelhoff
had suffered a blackout at some point prior to his medical examina-
tion.89
At the conclusion of the trial, the judge issued Jury Instruction No.
11, practically quoting Montana Code § 45-2-203:
A person who is in an intoxicated condition is criminally responsi-
ble for his conduct and an intoxicated condition is not a defense
to any offense and may not be taken into consideration in deter-
mining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the
offense unless the Defendant proves that he did not know that it
was an intoxicating substance when he consumed the substance
causing the condition.9
0
The jury convicted Egelhoff of two counts of deliberate homicide.9 1
Egelhoff appealed to the Montana Supreme Court, raising four
issues.9 2 The Montana Supreme Court confined its deliberations to
the due process violation raised by Egelhoff.
87. Md at 262-63.
88. See id. at 262.
89. See id. at 263. Dr. Knecht continued, stating that "an intoxicated person experiencing
such a blackout may walk, talk, and fully function, with people around the person unable to tell
that the person experienced a blackout." Id.
90. Id. at 263. Section 45-2-203 of the Montana Code states:
Responsibility-intoxicated condition. A person who is in an intoxicated condition is
criminally responsible for his conduct and an intoxicated condition is not a defense
to any offense and may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence
of a mental state which is an element of the offense unless the defendant proves that
he did not know that it was an intoxicating substance when he consumed, smoked,
sniffed, injected, or otherwise ingested the substance causing the condition.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1995).
91. SeeEgehoff, 900 P.2d at 263.
92. See id. The four issues presented on appeal were:
I. Was Egelhoff denied due process by ajury instruction that voluntary intoxication
may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state
which is an element of the offense?
II. Did the District Court err in permitting a lay witness to give opinion testimony?
III. Are the jury verdicts finding Egelhoff guilty of two counts of deliberate homicide
supported by substantial evidence?
IV. Did the District Court err in designating Egelhoff a dangerous offender for
purposes of parole?
Id. at 261.
93. See id. at 263.
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B. Montana Supreme Court Opinion
Egelhoff argued that by keeping evidence of intoxication from the
jury during its determination of his mental state, § 45-2-203 relieved
the State of its burden to prove that Egelhoff had acted "knowingly"
or "purposely," as required by the definition of deliberate homi-
cide.94 The State countered that Egelhoff's due process rights were
not violated because he was able to use evidence of intoxication in
other areas during the trial. Furthermore, the State argued that
there was no due process violation because the trial judge instructed
the jury that the State had to prove every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt." The Montana Supreme Court unani-
mously concluded that preventing consideration of evidence of
intoxication when determining Egelhoffs mental state violated his
due process rights, and the court found the statute unconstitution-
al. 97
The Montana Supreme Court was concerned largely with the
burden of proof for the mental elements of "knowingly" or "purpose-
ly."98 The court referred to the substantial amount of evidence
submitted by the state to the jury when it argued that Egelhoff had
knowingly or purposely shot Christianson and Payola.99 Instruction
No. 11, however, which embodied § 45-2-203, prevented Egelhoff
from rebutting the state's arguments with evidence of his intoxica-
tion."°  The court concluded that this instruction reduced the
state's burden of proof and denied Egelhoff due process.10'
94. See id.
95. See id. Egelhoff was allowed to submit evidence of intoxication to argue that his lack
of memory concerning the night's events was the result of an "alcohol-induced 'blackout'" and
that it was impossible for him to drive Christianson's vehicle, as was claimed. See id.
96. See id. at 264.
97. See id. at 266 ("We conclude that the defendant had a due process right to present and
have considered by the jury all relevant evidence to rebut the State's evidence on all elements
of the offense charged.").
98. See id. at 264.
99. See id at 265 (listing evidence presented by State). First, Egelhoff had to get the gun
from the glove compartment. The state also submitted evidence that Egelhoff made attempts
to escape detection, and that a witness saw a stick in the back seat of the car that she believed
enabled Egelhoff to drive the car from the back seat. A large number of people who
encountered Egelhoff that evening testified that he was coherent and did not appear drunk;
these included an employee at the grocery store and a motorist who attempted to aid the car
once it had settled in a ditch. Finally, Egelhoffs ability to kick the camera out of the officer's
hand demonstrated excellent coordination. See id
100. See id (stating that intoxication evidence was relevant to whether Egelhoff acted
"knowingly" or "purposely").
101. See id.
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The court stated that under Chambers v. Mississippi,1°2 this funda-
mental due process right was "the right to a fair opportunity to
defend against the State's accusations. " "1° Specifically, the court was
concerned with the burden of proof under this right. The court first
cited In re Winship"° for the constitutional requirement that the
state prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the elements of an offense.
Second, the court cited Sandstrom v. Montana"°5 for the premise that
102. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
103. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d at 265 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973)).
104. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). In re Winship involved the question of whether the Due Process
Clause requires proving the elements of crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 359 (1970). The Petitioner was a 12-year-old boy who had stolen $112 from a
pocketbook. The boy was charged with delinquency that would have amounted to larceny had
the boy been an adult, making him a juvenile delinquent under New York law. During an
adjudicatory hearing, the boy's attorney argued that the court should require a delinquency
charge to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Thejudge, although acknowledging that the
evidence might not support a reasonable doubt standard, felt that such a standard was not
constitutionally required. Rather, under section 744 of the New York Family Court Act, all that
was required was a preponderance of the evidence standard. See id. at 358-60. The Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision and the constitutionality of section 744. See id. at 360. The boy petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari on the grounds that the Constitution required a reasonable doubt
standard. See id. at 358. Whereas the Court in Winship was addressing whether a juvenile was
entitled to a reasonable doubt standard, the Montana Supreme Court was concerned with the
conclusion that the Due Process Clause requires a reasonable doubt standard in criminal trials.
Compare id. at 359, with Egelhoff, 900 P.2d at 264.
105. 442 U.S. 510 (1979). The issue in Sandstrom was the constitutionality of a jury
instruction in Montana that the "law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences
of his voluntary acts." Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510,513 (1979) (adopting prosecution's
request tojudge forjury instruction). David Sandstrom was on trial for the deliberate homicide
of Annie Jessen. See id at 512. Sandstrom argued that a personality disorder aggravated by
alcohol consumption had prevented him from acting "knowingly" or "purposely," as required
by statute. See id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102(1) (a) (1978)). The State requested
the jury instruction in question and Sandstrom objected, claiming that the instruction
unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof for "knowingly" or "purposely" to the defense.
See id. at 513. Thejudge overruled the objection, delivered the instruction, and Sandstrom was
convicted. See id. The Supreme Court of Montana agreed with Sandstrom's contention that
Mullaney v. Wi/bur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), In re Winship, 397 U.S. 197 (1970), and Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), prohibited shifting the burden of proving the offense elements, but
that the prohibition was not absolute and that the state could shift the burden under some
circumstances. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 513-514; see also infra note 119 (discussing Mullaney);
supra note 104 (discussing Winship); infra note 119 (discussing Patterson). The Court stated that
because Sandstrom was required to submit evidence that "he did not intend the ordinary
consequences of his acts, [and] not to disprove that he acted purposely or knowingly," the
instruction was constitutional. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 513. The Supreme Court reversed,
concentrating on the practical effect of the instruction on the jury. See id. at 514. The Court
stated that a reasonable jury could have concluded from the language in the instruction that
there was a presumption of intent and that it was irrebutable if sufficient facts were presented.
See id. at 517. Thejury also could have believed that they should find intent unless Sandstrom
provided significant evidence otherwise, effectively shifting the burden onto the defense to
disprove intent. See id. The Court determined that either of these interpretations would have
violated the prohibition on burden shifting established in In re Winship and its progeny. See id.
at 521. Ultimately, the Court held that the jury instruction was a due process violation because
it shifted the burden of proof of the mental elements of the crime. See id.
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shifting the burden of proof of the mental element of a crime to the
defendant was unconstitutional.10 6
The court also cited dicta in Martin v. Ohio 07 to support its
conclusions.108 The defendant in Martin was convicted of murder
despite a claim of self-defense."° The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision, stating that it was not unconstitutional to shift the burden
of proving self-defense to a defendant."' In its discussion, the
Court differentiated between a situation such as that in Martin, in
which the defendant is required to put forward the evidence in
support of her defense, and another in which ajury is ordered not to
consider evidence relevant to determining whether the defendant is
guilty. n l
The Montana Supreme Court, although noting that this discussion
was not central to the Martin holding, indicated that it was responsive
to the situation in Egelhoff." Egelhoff was allowed to admit evi-
dence relating to his intoxication, but § 45-2-203 prevented the jury
from using the evidence to determine if he acted knowingly or
purposely."' "By allowing the jury to consider such evidence,"
106. See Egelhoff, 900 P.2d at 265.
107. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
108. See Egeloff, 900 P.2d at 265-66.
109. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 231 (1987). The defendant in Martin was on trial for
the murder of her husband. After the two had argued over money, the defendant went upstairs,
coming downstairs later with her husband's gun in her hand. He questioned her as to what was
in her hand and "came at her." Id. at 231. She fired several shots, hitting him with three and
killing him. Mrs. Martin was charged with aggravated murder and pleaded self-defense at trial.
Ohio case law had held that self-defense was an affirmative defense. See id. at 230 (citing Martin
v. Ohio, 488 N.E.2d 166, 168 (1986)). Under Ohio law, the defendant had the burden of
proving an affirmative defense. See id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (1982)).
Martin was convicted, and she appealed the decision, claiming that placing the burden on her
violated the Due Process Clause. See id. at 231. Both the Ohio Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of Ohio rejected her claim. See i&. at 230-31.
110. See id. at 233. As in Egeihoff, the Court relied on Patterson to analyze Martin's due
process claim. See i& at 232-33; see also infra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing facts
of Patterson and Court's holding that defendant's due process rights were not violated because
defendant was not required to disprove any facts esstential to charge of second-degree murder).
In Patterson, the Court cited the requirement of In re Winship that the prosecution satisfy its
burden of proof of every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court
held that this results in the state requiring the defendant to prove the affirmative defense of
extreme emotional disturbance. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 206. The Court in Martin felt that the
similarity between the situations in Martin and Patterson, combined with the deference accorded
the states in defining their criminal justice systems, made the Ohio statute constitutional. See
Martin, 480 U.S. at 233. Specifically, there was no constitutional violation because Martin had
the opportunity to convince the jury that she had acted in self-defense, and the jury decided to
convict. See id.
111. See Martin, 480 U.S. at 233-34 (stating that it would be contrary to the holding of In re
Winship if the "jury had been instructed that self-defense evidence could not be considered in
determining whether there was a reasonable doubt about the State's case").
112. SeeEgelhoff, 900 P.2d at 265.
113. See i. at 266.
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wrote the court, "we permit the jury to make its decision on all of the
relevant evidence as required under Martin.""1 4
III. U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION: MONTANA v. EGELHOFF
A. Plurality Opinion
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, overruled the Montana
Supreme Court and held that Montana's exclusion of involuntary
intoxication evidence when determining the mental status of a
defendant was not a due process violation."' The decision, written
by Justice Scalia, assailed the Montana Supreme Court's assertion that
the Due Process Clause guaranteed the right to introduce all relevant
evidence." 6 Justice Scalia emphasized that there are a number of
evidentiary exclusions that have been found constitutional," 7 in part
due to the deference the Court accords states in administering their
criminal justice systems."' In light of this deference, the Court
stated that the evidentiary restriction in Egelhoff should be analyzed
under the test established in New York v. Patterson."9 The relevant
114. Id.
115. SeeMontana v. EgeIhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2025 (1996) (plurality opinion), rev k900 P.2d
260 (Mont. 1995).
116. See id. at 2017 (plurality opinion).
117. See id. (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia cited Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991),
in which the Court held that relevant evidence may be excluded if the defendant does not
adhere to proper procedures. SeeEgelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2017 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia
also relied on Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which permits the exclusion of relevant evidence
for a number of reasons, including the danger of misleading the jury or unfair prejudice. See
Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2017 (plurality opinion); FED. R. EVD. 403. Finally, the Court pointed to
hearsay exclusions, which keep unreliable evidence out of court. SeeEgelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2017
(plurality opinion).
118. See Ege/hoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2017 (plurality opinion) (citing NewYork v. Patterson, 432 U.S.
197, 201-02 (1977)). The Court in Patterson extended great latitude to the states in administer-
ing their criminal justice system and held that, accordingly, the Court should be careful to
dismantle an action taken by the states in this area. See 432 U.S. at 201-02.
119. 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977), cited in Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2017 (plurality opinion). The
Court in Patterson addressed the constitutionality of a NewYork law placing the burden on the
defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the affirmative defense of extreme
emotional distress when attempting to reduce a second-degree murder charge to manslaughter.
The defendant, Gordon Patterson, separated from his wife, Roberta Patterson. Roberta began
to see an ex-flancd, John Northrup. On December 27, 1970, Patterson borrowed a rifle from
a friend and went to the home of his father-in-law. There he saw Roberta naked with Northrup
and proceeded to shoot Northrup twice in the head, killing him. See id. at 198. Patterson was
charged with second-degree murder.
New York allowed defendants to assert the affirmative defense of "act[ing] under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or
excuse." Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975)). The trial judge instructed the
jury that under New York law, the State had to prove the elements of second-degree murder
beyond a reasonable doubt and that Patterson had to prove that he acted while under the
influence of extreme emotional distress by a preponderance of the evidence. If the jury
believed that Patterson acted under the influence of extreme emotional distress in intentionally
killing Northrup, it could convict him for manslaughter, but not for murder. See id. at 200. The
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language in Patterson indicates that the judgment of a state in
administering its criminal justice system "is not subject to prQscription
under the Due Process Clause unless 'it offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental.'" 12 ' Thus, wrote Justice Scalia, Egelhoff
jury convicted Patterson of second-degree murder, and the Appellate Division affirmed. See id.
at 201.
After Patterson appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court decided
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). In Muilaney, the Court struck down a Maine statute that
allowed a defendant to rebut the statutory presumption that he committed murder with malice
aforethought if the defandant proved that he acted in the "heat of passion on sudden
provocation." Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703 (rejecting Maine's statute, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17
§ 2551 (West 1964)). The Court expounded that the statute violated due process because it
shifted the burden of persuasion from the prosecution to the defense. See id at 704.
Patterson argued that the New York law was identical to the Maine law, but the Court of
Appeals rejected this argument. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201, aff'g347 N.E.2d 898 (N.Y. 1976).
The decision stated that the New York law was different than the one in Mullaney because, in
proving that he acted under extreme emotional disturbance, Patterson was not required to
disprove any facts essential to the charge of second-degree murder. See id. at 214-15 (discussing
reasoning of New York Court of Appeals). Patterson appealed to the Supreme Court on due
process grounds. See id. at 201.
120. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2017 (plurality opinion) (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201-02).
The Court in Patterson, much like the Court in Egelhoff, began its fundamental rights inquiry by
discussing the history of the issue. The Court noted that placing the burden of proving extreme
emotional distress on the defendant was a broader version of the common-law heat of passion
on sudden provocation defense, which also required a defendant to prove the elements of the
defense. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202. This was the rule for many affirmative defenses at
common law, until the Court in Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469,492-93 (1895), rejected such
a burden for insanity. It soon became a requirement for prosecutors to disprove the elements
of most defenses, including provocation. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202.
The Court in Patterson noted, however, that the decision in Davis was not a constitutional
ruling, as evidenced by the ruling in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). Leland affirmed the
placement of the burden of proving affirmative defenses on the defendant. See Patterson, 432
U.S. at 203-04 (restating holding of Leland that affirmed constitutionality of requiring defendant
to prove defense of insanity by reasonable doubt).
The Court then considered the doctrine established by In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and
its progeny. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 204. The Court in In re Winship stated that the
Constitution requires that states prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt
to obtain a conviction. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
The Court also considered Mullaney, which reinforced the holding of In re Winship by finding
that a Maine statute, which required a defendant to prove an affirmative defense by disproving
an element of the charge against him, violated the Due Process Clause. See Patterson, 432 U.S.
at 205.
The Court then considered the implication of dvera v. Delaware 429 U.S. 877 (1976), an
appeal that claimed Leland's approval of the reasonable doubt standard in the insanity defense
had been overruled in In re Winship and Mullaney and replaced by the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 204. In Rivera, the Court dismissed for lack of a
substantial federal question. See Rivera, 429 U.S. at 877.
The Court in Patterson stated that these cases stood for the proposition that once a state
proved the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it could choose to allow
a defendant to submit an affirmative defense of insanity if proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 206. The Court then determined that the NewYork law on
severe emotional disturbance adhered to this doctrine. See id. The prosecution was required
to prove every element of second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, and the court
instructed the jury accordingly. See id. at 205-06. Additionally, none of the evidence submitted
to establish severe emotional distress was required to disprove an element of second-degree
murder. See id. at 206. Distinguishing the situation in Mullaney from Patterson, the Court
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had to show that the "right to have a jury consider evidence of his
voluntary intoxication in determining whether he possesses the
requisite mental state is a 'fundamental principle of justice." 2' 1
Justice Scalia analyzed the historical treatment of the relationship
between voluntary intoxication and mental state. 122  The Court
noted that prior to the nineteenth century, it almost uniformly was
held that evidence of intoxication could not be presented at trial.1
2 1
In contrast, Egelhoff had argued that during the course of the nine-
teenth century, courts had accepted such evidence to show that a
defendant did not possess the required mental state to be guilty of
the crime. 4  The Court, however, gave great weight to the ten
states (including Montana) that continue to adhere to the old
common-law rule," and stated that it was difficult to recognize the
right to present intoxication evidence as fundamental when one-fifth
of the states practiced otherwise. 26
reiterated that there were no presumptions of guilt against Patterson and that the jury simply
decided that he failed to prove his defense. See id, at 216-17. Consequently, the Court deemed
the New York law on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance constitutional.
See id. at 205.
121. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2017 (plurality opinion).
122. See id. (plurality opinion) ("Our primary guide in determining whether the principle
in question is fundamental is, of course, historical practice.").
123. See i. at 2018-19 (plurality opinion) (discussing early history of intoxication evidence
in law). Justice Scalia began his examination with the premise that colonial England viewed an
intoxicated offender as if he committed the crime while sober. See id. at 2018 (plurality
opinion) (citing 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CRoWN *32-33). Early American law adopted a
similar stance, rejecting intoxication as a defense to a crime. See id. (plurality opinion) (citing
HALE, supra, at *32 n.3).
124. See id. at 2019-20 (plurality opinion) (examining treatment of intoxication evidence
since 19th century). According tojustice Scalia, the earliest acceptance of intoxication evidence
came in 1819 in an English case in which the judge considered intoxication relevant to whether
the defendant committed premeditated murder. See id. at 2019 (plurality opinion) (citing 1 W.
RUSSELL, CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS *8). Although the view was slow to gain acceptance,Justice
Scalia concedes that it became widely accepted by the end of the 19th century. See id. (plurality
opinion).
125. See i. at 2020 n.2 (plurality opinion) (noting thatArizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia,
Hawaii, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, and Texas adhere to common-law rule). Three
of the nine states have case law that bars the use of voluntary intoxication evidence: Arkansas
(White v. State, 717 S.W.2d 784 (Ark. 1986)); Mississippi (Lanier v. State, 533 So. 2d 473 (Miss,
1988)); and South Carolina (State v. Vaughn, 232 S.E.2d 328 (S.C. 1977)). Five states have
enacted statutes interpreted to bar such evidence: Delaware (Wyant v. State, 519 A.2d 649 (Del.
1986) (construing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 421 (1987)); Georgia (Foster v. State, 374 S.E.2d
188 (Ga. 1988) (construing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-4 (1968)); Hawaii (State v. Souza, 813 P.2d
1384 (Haw. 1991) (construing HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-230 (1986)); Missouri (State v. Envin, 848
S.W.2d 476 (Mo. 1993) (construing Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.076 (1983)); and Texas (Hawkins v.
State, 605 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (construing TX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04 (West
1974)). Arizona recently has enacted a voluntary intoxication statute. SeeAIZ. REV. STAT. §
1503 (1995).
126. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2019-20 (plurality opinion).
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The Court attempted to defend the application of the old
common-law rule by offering various justifications. 27 The first was
that excluding evidence of intoxication deters the commission of
other crimes while intoxicated. 28 Second, the Court stated that
127. See id. at 2020 (plurality opinion) (statingiustifications to support argument that rule
permitting intoxication evidence in determinations of mental state is not fundamental principle
ofjustice).
128. See id. (stating that exclusion of intoxication evidence generally deters crimes by
increasing punishments for all crimes and specifically by incarcerating intoxicated offenders).
The deterrence argument's greatest fault lies in the case of alcoholics. See generally Nemerson,
supra note 2, at 434-40 (undertaking extensive examination of legal ramifications of alcoholism).
The inability of the law to keep pace with society on issues involving alcohol is best represented
in its approach to alcoholism. See id. at 395.
The American Medical Association has defined alcoholics as "those excessive drinkers whose
dependence on alcohol has attained such a noticeable disturbance or interference with their
bodily or mental health, their interpersonal relations and their satisfactory social and economic
functioning." Frederick P. Hafetz, Alcoholism & Drug Addiction: The Affect on Mens Rea, in MENS
REA: STATE OF MIND DEFENSES IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL FRAUD CASES 9, 11 (PL Litig. & Admin.
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 140, 1985). It generally is believed in the medical
community that alcoholism is a disease. See ELVIN MORTONJELLINEK, THE DISEASE CONCEPT OF
ALCOHOLISM 12 (1960) (providing what many consider original work on disease concept of
alcoholism).
The majority of courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, refuses to acknowledge that
alcoholism is a disease marked by an uncontrollable urge to drink. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514, 535 (1968) (refusing to recognize "irresistible compulsion to drink" argument for
alcoholics). Rather, the law maintains that the consumption of the first drink is voluntary,
making any intoxication that might follow also voluntary. See United States v. Shuckahasee, 609
F.2d 1351, 1355 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding alcoholic defendant responsible for intoxicated
actions). Such an approach is too rigid in light of the current state of knowledge on the biology
and psychology of alcoholism as a disease. See Nemerson, supra note 2, at 398. Given that the
law permits the mental disease of insanity as an excusing factor in the commission of a crime,
its stubborn refusal to adopt the mental disease approach to alcoholism based on its conception
of the first drink as voluntary is troubling. SeeEarle B. Wilson, Alcoholism: A Mitigating Factor in
the Disciplinay Proces, 31 HOW. LJ. 355, 357 (1988) (submitting that voluntary nature of first
drink has prevented alcoholism from attaining status of insanity in criminal defenses).
Under the most widely accepted disease model of alcoholism, the alcoholic has little control
over his consumption. See Nemerson, supra note 2, at 397. A commission on alcoholism wrote
that alcoholism is "a condition in which an individual has lost control over his alcohol intake
in the sense that he is consistently unable to refrain from drinking or to stop drinking before
getting intoxicated." Id. at 397 n.20 (citing THOMAS FA PLAUT, COOPERATIVE COMM'N ON THE
STUDY OF ALCHOLiSM, ALCOHOL PROBLEMS: A REPORT TO THE NATION 39 (1967)). In this sense,
an alcoholic is unable to choose when to drink or, once drinking commences, to choose to stop.
See id. at 399 (citing Mark Keller, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism Revisited, 37J. STUD. ALCOHOL
1694, 1704 (1976)).
Almost equally as important to the analysis of alcoholism under the law is the belief that one
cannot become an alcoholic, but rather, the need for alcohol develops naturally, and not as a
result of deliberate action by the individual. See id, at 399 n.27 (citingJackson A. Smith, The
Choice of Treatment Procedure in the Alcoholic, in ALCOHOLISM: BASIC ASPECTS AND TREATMENT 173,
174-75 (Harold Edwin Himwich ed., 1957)). The response of alcoholics to alcohol will vary, but
most who have developed a tolerance to alcohol "'can walk a straight line, speak clearly, carry
on business, and drive a car with alcohol levels in their blood that would make the novice
unable to walk!'" Id. at 403 (quoting F. Seixas, The Course of Alcoholism, in NADAJ. ESTES & M.
EDITH HENEMANN, ALCOHOLISM: DEVELOPMENT, CONSEQUENCES, AND INTERVENTIONS 70 (2d
ed. 1986)).
Alcoholics also display a tendency to blackout. See id. at 406 (citing Mark Keller, A Lexicon
of Disablements Related to Alcohol Consumption, in ALCOHOL-RELATED DISABILITIES 23 (Griffith
Edwards etal. eds., 1977)). It is interesting that Egelhoff displayed both of these characteristics,
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such rules codify the moral culpability of crimes committed while
intoxicated. 129  A third justification was to avoid confusing juries
although there is no mention that Egelhoff asserted that he was an alcoholic. See Egelhoff, 116
S. Ct. at 2016 (plurality opinion). The most important characteristic of the alcoholic in relation
to the deterrence justification is that he often does not know of his tendency to consume. See
Nemerson, supra note 2, at 434. Thus, the alcoholic is unaware that the threats of increased
punishment are aimed at him. See id. at 435. In this way, the deterrence argument fails. It is
unlikely that an individual who is unaware of his predisposition to drinking will curb
consumption in an effort to avoid the stiff penalties that may follow an intoxicated action.
Similarly, many alcoholics have a subjective denial of their addiction. See id. This fact,
combined with the inability to control either the onset of drinking, subsequent consumption,
or the results of such drinking, makes these types of alcoholics immune to any deterrent force
of provisions such as § 45-2-203.
129. See Egelhoff, 116 S. CL at 2020 (plurality opinion) (expressing view that exclusion rules
reflect society's "moral perception" that those who become intoxicated voluntarily should be
culpable for their actions). A number of critics argue that morality is not sufficient to justify a
complete bar on evidence of intoxication. One must balance this concept with a basic tenet of
criminal law: "The legal system must not impose punishment unless the defendant is
blameworthy or bears moral responsibility for her act." R. George Wright, The Progressive Logic
of Criminal Responsibility and the Circumstances of the Most Deprived, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 459, 459-60
(1994). Professor Wright argues that the requirement of moral guilt is a uniformly acknowl-
edged concept. See id. at 460 n.4 (listing numerous legal scholars supporting concept of moral
guilt). Once again, the alcoholic presents problems forJustice Scalia. As discussed above, the
alcoholic is unable to control the consumption of alcohol. See supra note 128 (describing status
of alcoholism in medical community as a disease); see also Susan F. Mandiberg, Protecting Society
and Defendants Too: The Constitutional Dilemma of Mental Abnormality and Intoxicating Defenses, 53
FORDHAM L. REv. 221, 251 n.138 (1984) (positing that sufferers of alcoholism are unable to
control amount they drink).
Associated with this theory is the idea that the first drink often is involuntary. See supra note
128 and accompanying text. Although science is fairly certain that the alcoholic is predisposed
to drinking, see Nemerson, supra note 2, at 398, it still is quite difficult to identify an individual
in that category. See id. at 400-14 (discussing causes of alcoholism). Thus, unless an individual
is aware that his drinking will lead to an uncontrollable addiction, it is hard to assign moral
blame, because "[t] o blame an individual for doing an act, when he could not have done other
than that act, is to misapply the concept of blame." Id at 414. Similarly, if the law permits
involuntary intoxication to excuse violations of the law, then it is hard to punish the alcoholic,
who essentially suffers from involuntary intoxication. See id. ("Whether the cause of the
intoxication is an external person over whom the actor has no control, or an internal disease
over which he has not control, the lack of culpability is the same.").
The second problem with this rationale is that the law permits morally guilty defendants to
assert that they did not have the requisite mental state to be convicted of the offense. For
example, the Model Penal Code forbids an intoxicated defendant from claiming that his
inebriation prevented him from forming the required intent to commit a crime. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.08 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The same Code would allow the defendant
who, knowing that he needs to take medication, fails to do so and commits a crime to escape
punishment based on a failure to meet the mental requirement of the crime. See id. § 4.02.
Although the two are equally guilty on moral grounds, the end result is radically different and
is a strong indication that morality is a weak basis for law. See discussion infra Part IV (analyzing
how morality dictated decision in Egethofo).
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with misleading evidence."3  The Court concluded that although
130. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2021 (plurality opinion) (concluding that evidence of
intoxication can be viewed as misleading because juries incorrectly will accept argument that
defendant could not possess required mental state). Justice Scalia suggested that "drunks"
behave violently not because of a biological reaction, but because society has established that
this is how "drunks" act. See id. (plurality opinion). He asserted that juries will be quick to
accept this belief and incorrectly will acquit a defendant. See id. (plurality opinion); see also
George E. Dix, Due Process and Voluntary Intoxication Defense: Montana Case Could Show iWether the
Supreme Court Is Inclined to Constitutionalize Difgwult Questions of Criminal Law, TEX. LAW., Feb. 5,
1996, at 290-91 (advancing theory that legislatures can argue that exclusions such as § 45-2-203
properly avoid having juries consider misleading evidence).
Four problems have been identified when there is speculation about the effects of
intoxication on behavior. First, one must determine what the defendant consumed. Second,
one must reconstruct circumstances of the situation. Third, one must factor in personal
variations, for example how much the defandant regularly drank and how high his alcohol
tolerance was. Fourth, one must determine how much the defendant's cognitive skills were
impaired by the alcohol. SeeRichardJ. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, TheRole of MentalHealth
Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Casefor Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REv. 427, 436 n.18
(1980); see also 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 205, at 883-89 (John William Strong et al. eds., 4th
ed. 1992) (examining problems and inaccuracies involved in testing for drunkeness).
Although the often speculative nature of intoxication evidence has been acknowledged,
concerns with respect to accuracy must yield to the ethical problem of convicting a defendant
when he may not satisfy the elements of a crime. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra, at 438 (arguing
that notions of fairness would be sacrificed if state defined guilt subjectively while forbidding
defendant opportunity "to reconstruct his actual state of mind"); see also LAFAVE & SCoTr,
CRIMINAL LAW § 3.11(a), at 268 (1986) ("[I]t is a basic premise of Anglo-American criminal law
that the physical conduct and the state of mind must concur."). Thus, it is difficult to justify the
absolute exclusion of relevant evidence when a state still imposes a mental element for a proper
conviction.
In addition, the rules of evidence already allow the admission of evidence that is at best
speculative as to the mental state of a defendant. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra, at 473
(examining courts treatment of expert testimony on mental state); see also FED. R. EvID. 401-403
(providing standards for admission of relevant evidence). For example, most jurisdictions allow
a defendant to provide testimony that due to insanity or diminished capacity, he lacked the
required mental state to be guilty of a crime. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra, at 473 (suggesting
that courts should be more likely to accept expert testimony on mens rea than on claims such
as insanity); see also Mandiberg, supra note 129, at 240 (arguing that because jury will examine
history of defendant and events in question, it is less likely that defendant will be able to fake
intoxication evidence than evidence for insanity, mistake, or legal provocation).
Similarly, there is little reason to believe that the intoxicated defendant will have an easier
time fabricating a defense than a defendant asserting insanity or diminished capacity. The
intelligence and planning required to accomplish such a deception often is much beyond the
capability of the typical defendant, who, more often than not, is "weak, impulsive, and frequently
diseased." See Hall, supra note 3, at 1048.
What further frustrates the argument that intoxication evidence misleads juries is the use of
such evidence as elements of crimes. It is hard to argue that intoxication evidence is relevant
when used to show that a defendant was guilty of a crime such as driving while intoxicated, and
then to argue that the very same evidence is "misleading" as to the mental state of a defendant
for a crime such as deliberate homicide. Egelhoff advanced this argument in his brief, asserting
that the legislature did not deem the evidence in question as irrelevant or unreliable because
it predicated an entire section of its criminal code on evidence of intoxication. See Brief for
Respondent at 32 n.16, Egeihoff (No. 95-566) (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8-401 to -422
(1991) as examples of crimes in Montana requiring intoxication for liability).
Justice Scalia fears that allowing intoxication evidence will lead to a large number of acquitals
in criminal cases. Therefore, he believes that elimination of intoxication from examination will
deter criminals from committing crimes while intoxicated. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2020
(plurality opinion); see also Note, supra note 1, at 1684 (mentioning "floodgate" concern).
Although many commentators believe that Justice Scalia's concern is valid when allowing
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many states recognized the relevance of intoxication to mens rea, the
rule permitting intoxication evidence on the question of mens rea was
of "too recent vintage, and has not received sufficiently uniform and
permanent allegiance to qualify as fundamental, especially since it
displaces a lengthy common-law tradition which remains supported by
valid justifications today."131
Justice Scalia then addressed the due process guarantees that the
Montana Supreme Court cited in finding § 45-2-203 unconstitutional.
The Court first dismissed the Montana Supreme Court's reliance on
Chambers v. Mississippi.3 2 The plurality wrote that "Chambers was an
exercise in highly case-specific error correction"" and made much
of Justice Powell's limitation clause in Chambers that stated: "In
reaching thisjudgment, we establish no new principles of constitution-
al law. Nor does our holding signal any diminution in the respect
traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and imple-
mentation of their own criminal trial rules and procedures."' "3
Thus, to the majority, Chambers represented nothing more than the
intoxication as a defense, other commentators express the idea that allowing intoxication
evidence in determining mens rea will not lead to massive numbers of free criminals. See id. at
1686 (examining "floodgate" concern but stating that as long as intoxication defense is "limited
to appropriate circumstances," it will not be a problem).
Most commentators agree thatjuries should treat each intoxication situation on its own merits
and determine if the accused did indeed form intent. See id. at 1687 (suggesting that few
defendants will be able to convince juries that their intoxication prevented them from forming
intent to commit crime).
131. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2021 (plurality opinion). One can argue thatJustice Scalia gives
too much deference to a common-law doctrine that has significantly shifted over time. Although
courts did forbid consideration of voluntary intoxication early in the history of criminal law, as
Justice Scalia maintains, see id. at 2018-20 (plurality opinion) (discussing early common-law
abhorrence of intoxication), there has been a definitive shift away from such a draconian ap-
proach, see i. at 2030 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (pointing to "significant modification" to
common-law doctrine on intoxication in 19th century); see also Hall, supra note 3, at 1048
(noting "radical modification" towards more logical and humane intoxication doctrine during
19th century).
Additionally, one commentator has suggested that 150 years of English and American case
law support the rule allowing evidence of intoxication to mitigate specific intent crimes. See
Benton, supra note 3, at 1177. Justice Scalia also fails to recognize that the common law did
allow evidence of involuntary intoxication. See HALE, supra note 123, at *32 (noting that
intoxication resulting from incorrect medical prescription or that actions of enemy excused
commission of crime). Thus, the common law recognized the relevance of intoxication to
criminal activity, but did not comprehend the inconsistencies in their stances on involuntary and
voluntary intoxication until the nineteenth century when it began to carve out exceptions to
exclusions for voluntary intoxication. SeeEgelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2030 (O'Connor,J. dissenting)
(examining the 19th century modification and its effect).
The common-law tradition is outdated, given that scholars and politicians alike substantially
recognize that morality alone cannotjustify the exclusion of relevant evidence. See supra note
120 and accompanying text.
132. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
133. Egehoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2022 (plurality opinion).
134. 1& at 2021-22 (plurality opinion) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03
(1973)).
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idea that faulty evidentiary rules, when viewed in their totality, can
lead to a violation of the Due Process Clause." 5  The Court also
rejected Egelhoff's argument that Crane v. Kentucky 3 6 represented
the correct interpretation of Chambers 37 Justice Scalia wrote that
Crane stood for the notion that evidentiary restrictions are unconstitu-
tional under the Chambers doctrine when there is no valid state
justification, and that was not the case with § 45-2-203.1'
Addressing the Montana Supreme Court's use of In re Winship
39
and Sandstrom v. Montana,"4 the Court held these cases inapplicable
because § 45-2-203 did not shift the burden of proof in proving an
element of the offense.' 4 ' As the Montana Supreme Court opined,
the statute did not shift the prosecution's burden, but did reduce
it.'42 Such a reduction, wrote the Court, never has been unconstitu-
tional unless it violated "a fundamental principle of fairness;""4 here
it did not.144 ,
Finally, the Court made quick work of the Montana Supreme
Court's reliance on Martin v. Ohio." Justice Scalia stated that the
Court must concern itself with its prior holdings and not dicta.
46
Because no decision of the Court had adopted the ideas reflected in
the Martin dicta, they were, in Justice Scalia's opinion, irrelevant to
the case at hand. 47
B. Justice Ginsburg's Concurrence
In a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg suggested that the
constitutionality of § 45-2-203 turned on its characterization.' 4 If
§ 45-2-203 was a bar to admitting relevant evidence, then it was a due
135. See id. at 2022 (plurality opinion).
136. 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
137. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2022 (plurality opinion) (reiterating Crane holding that
exclusion of evidence in that case was unjustified and, thus, a due process violation).
138. See id.
139. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
140. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
141. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2022 (plurality opinion).
142. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 266 (Mont. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996)
(plurality opinion).
143. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2023 (plurality opinion).
144. See id. at 2018-23 (plurality opinion) (examining historical treatment ofintoxication and
concluding that common-law tradition of treating .intoxicated defendant as culpable is
established rule).
145. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
146. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2023 (plurality opinion) ("'It is to the holdings of our cases,
rather than their dicta, that we must attend."' (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 114
S. Ct. 1673, 1676 (1994))).
147. See i. at 2023 (plurality opinion) (stating that even if Martin dicta required admission
of all relevant evidence, Supreme Court case law has shown that it is incorrect).
148. See i. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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process violation.149 If it was a legislative redefinition of the mens
rea element for deliberate homicide, then there was no constitutional
infringement of Egelhoff's rights.50 Ginsburg ultimately opined
that although she did not feel § 45-2-203 was simply an evidentiary
restriction, she would decline to rule § 45-2-203 unconstitutional.'5 '
First, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that § 45-2-203 appears in Title
45 ("Crimes") and not Title 26 ("Rules of Evidence") of the Montana
Code, indicating that it might not be a strictly evidentiary statute. 12
Rather, § 45-2-203 represented the Legislatures' desire to remove
voluntary intoxication from the inquiry into the mental state of a
defendant 5 3  As such, in proving the mental state of deliberate
homicide, the State had to show that the defendant committed the
murder purposely or knowingly, or "'under circumstances that would
otherwise establish knowledge or purpose 'but for' [the defendant's]
voluntary intoxication.""' Thus, § 45-2-203 did not run afoul of In
re Winship's requirement that the prosecution must prove every
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt because the State's
definition of the offense guided the inquiry. 5
Second, Justice Ginsburg reiterated that a state is- accorded
deference in defining the elements of its crimes, and that criminal
statutes are unconstitutional only if they offend a fundamental
principle of justice."6  Restating the rationale of the plurality,
Justice Ginsburg intimated that the common-law history of refusing to
admit evidence of voluntary intoxication, combined with the
"significant minority" of states that still employ the common-law
149. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
150. See id. (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
151. See id. at 2024-25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
152. See id at 2024 (GinsburgJ., concurring) (citing MONT. CODEANN. § 45-2-203 (1995)).
Justice Ginsburg indicated that the presence of measures referring to duress and entrapment
supported this line of reasoning. See id/ (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
153. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
154. I& (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for American Alliance for Rights and
Responsibilities et al. as Amici Curiae at 6, Egehoff (No. 95-566)); see also Brief for Petitioner at
35-36, Egelhoff (No. 95-566) ("[un the instant case ... the State convinced the jury, which was
instructed to convict only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Egelhoff... [killed] ...
the victims knowingly or purposely, that he had done so . .. ."); Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae at 10-12, Egeloff (No. 95-566) (stating that the Montana statutes "require proof
of purposeful or knowing conduct, apart from voluntary intoxication").
155. SeeEgelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (GinsburgJ., concurring) (citing Patterson v. NewYork,
432 U.S. 197, 211 n.12 (1977)).
156. See id. at 2024-25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 232
(1987)); Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201-02 (stating that in due process challenge, courts should
examine whether law violates a fundamental principle ofjustice). Justice Ginsburg asserted that
the deference is even greater when examining "the extent to which moral culpability should be
a prerequisite to conviction of a crime." Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 545 (1968) (BlackJ, concurring)).
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doctrine, made § 45-2-203 constitutional.1 7 Justice Ginsburg's
concurrence accorded great deference to the other states that have
adopted statutes similar to Montana's and reasoned that such laws,
which already have been declared constitutional, should not be found
otherwise by this case.' She concluded that § 45-2-203 suffered no
"constitutional shoal."'59
C. Justice O'Conner's Dissent
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer joined Justice O'Connor's
vehement dissent arguing that § 45-2-203 violated the boundaries
established in the right to present a defense doctrine."'t Justice
O'Connor attacked the plurality's assertion that § 45-2-203 fell within
the ambit of other constitutional evidentiary restrictions and argued
that none of the restrictions cited by the plurality led to a complete
bar of relevant evidence, as did the Montana statute at issue.161 By
excluding evidence that would allow the defendant to mitigate the
prosecution's mental state argument, the state no longer had to prove
157. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2025 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing EgeLhff, 116 S. Ct. at
2017-19 (plurality opinion)).
158. See id. at 2025 (GinsburgJ., concurring) (citing statutes and case law in Arizona, Hawaii,
and Pennsylvania). The court in State v. Souza, 813 P.2d 1384 (Haw. 1991), ruled that Hawaii's
version of § 45-2-203 was constitutional, stating that: "'[The] legislature was entitled to redefine
the mens rea element of crimes and to exclude evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate
state of mind."' Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2025 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Souza, 813 P.2d
at 1386).
In Arizona, the voluntary intoxication statute was deemed constitutional in State v. Ramos, 648
P.2d 119 (Ariz. 1982) (en banc), in which the court noted: "'Perhaps the state of mind which
needs to be proven here is a watered down mens rea; however, this is the prerogative of the
legislature."' Egelhoff 116 S. Ct. at 2025 (GinsburgJ., concurring) (quoting Ramos, 648 P.2d at
121).
The Pennsylvania statute on voluntary intoxication was upheld in Commonwealth v. Rumsey, 454
A.2d 1121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983), in which the court stated:
Redefinition of the kind and quality of mental activity that constitutes the mens rea
element of crimes is a permissible part of the legislature's role in the "constantly
shifting adjustment between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing
religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man."
Id. at 1122 (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968)).
159. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2025 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
160. See id. at 2026-27 (O'Connor,J, dissenting) (detailing Court's doctrine establishing right
to present a defense).
161. See id. at 2026 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing plurality's classification of
§ 45-2-203 as one of many evidentiary exclusions deemed constitutional). Justice O'Connor
admitted that the defendant does not enjoy a complete right to present all relevant evidence.
See id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting); see also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1986) (stating
that Supreme Court recognizes a state's right to exclude evidence "even if a defendant would
prefer to see that evidence admitted"). Many of the examples of evidentiary exclusions that
Justice Scalia cited, however, operated as partial bars to evidence. SeeEgelhoff 116 S. Ct. at 2026
(O'Connor, J, dissenting). Section 45-2-203 cannot be classified among these evidentiary rules
because it "places a blanket exclusion on a category of evidence that would allow the accused
to negate the offense's mental-state element." Id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
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beyond a reasonable doubt that Egelhoff had formed the required
mens rea. 6 2  As a result, § 45-2-203 constituted a due process
violation.1
63
In the first section of her dissent, Justice O'Connor dismantled the
plurality's treatment of Court precedent as "fact-bound, irrelevant,
and dicta. " " Justice O'Connor traced Chambers and its progeny,
concluding that those cases manifested the Court's belief that State
evidentiary exclusions violate a defendant's right to present a defense
if there are no valid justifications supporting them.1 6 Importantly,
Justice O'Connor dismissed the plurality's characterization of Chambers
as "'case-specific error correction.'" 1" She argued that the plurality
also ignored the warnings of Crane v. Kentucky, 67 that the
prosecution's case must be fully tested through the presentation of
relevant, reliable, contradictory evidence."6 Justice O'Connor also
cited Washington v. Texas169 for the proposition that the Due Process
Clause grants a defendant the right to call witnesses in his or her de-
fense.17°  She wrote: "These cases, taken together, illuminate a
simple principle: Due process demands that a criminal defendant be
afforded a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusa-
tions."' Justice O'Connor asserted that § 45-2-203 kept relevant
evidence out of the courtroom and thus denied Egelhoff "a fair
opportunity" while easing the prosecution's burden of proof.
1 2
162. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2026 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
163. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 2029 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
165. See id. at 2026-27 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 2027 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2022 (plurality
opinion)) ("[T]he plurality's characterization of Chambers as 'case-specific error correction'
cannot diminish its force as a prohibition on enforcement of state evidentiary rules that lead,
without sufficient justification, to the establishment of guilt by suppression of evidence
supporting the defendant's case.") (citation ommitted).
167. 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
168. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct at 2028 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that plurality cited
Crane for proposition that states may limit evidence for valid reason). Justice O'Connor,
continuing the discussion on the right to present a defense, cited Crane for a number of
propositions. For instance, she stated that Crane reaffirmed that states can exclude evidence if
it is unfair or unreliable, but that absent such justifications, restrictions on evidence violate the
Due Process Clause. See id. (O'ConnorJ., dissenting) (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,
690-91 (1986)). Such exclusions seriously impede a defendant's right to be heard in his defense,
and the holding in Crane was a reminder that such limitations prevent the adversarial process
from functioning properly. See i. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
169. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
170. See Egelhoff 116 S. Ct. at 2027 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14, 87 (1967)).
171. Id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
172. See id. at 2026 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting) (maintaining importance ofpreserving burden
of proof in due process analysis).
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Justice O'Connor's dissent also addressed the applicability of the In
re Winship doctrine. In re Winship established the standard that the
prosecution in a criminal case must prove all elements of the crime
"beyond a reasonable doubt."73 According to the Montana Su-
preme Court, the state had to prove that Egelhoff had committed the
murders "purposely or knowingly."174  If a jury is to determine a
subjective mental state, relevant evidence must be allowed to test the
prosecution's case and to avoid creating the assumption that the
defendant did in fact possess the statutory mental state." In this
way, the reasonable doubt mandate of In re Winship can be met.
Additionally, Justice O'Connor asserted that the plurality's dismissal
of the Montana Supreme Court's reliance on Martin v. Ohio'76 as
dictum was incorrect. 7  Martin, which differentiated between
allocating the burden of proof for a defense and the absolute bar of
possibly exculpatory evidence, was an important reaffirmation of the
doctrine forbidding the unjustified prohibition on relevant evi-
dence.'78
According to Justice O'Connor, the Court misrepresented the
holdings in these cases, ignored their warnings against untested
prosecution, and instead relied on them for the notion that a state
may bar relevant evidence with sufficient justification.' Justice
O'Connor argued that the Court's justifications, morality, and
deterrence, were nothing more than justifications for why Montana
would create statutes such as § 45-2-203 that would increase the
likelihood of successful prosecutions in cases involving intoxicated
defendants."ta As for the argument that such evidence confuses
juries and leads to "false acquittals," the exception that Montana
173. In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
174. Egehoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2028 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Montana v. Egelhoff, 900
P.2d 260, 265-66 (Mont. 1995), 7w'd, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996), and repeating the Montana
Supreme Court's statements that "knowingly or purposely" still was an element of the crime after
the passage of § 45-2-203).
175. See id. at 2027 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor argued that keeping this
evidence from the jury had two results. The first result was that the prosecution had an easier
time convincing a jury that Egelhoff possessed the required mental state, because evidence of
intoxication was not allowed to cast doubt on their argument. See i&. at 2028 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Second, ajury would find it difficult to conclude that Egelhoff did not possess the
required "subjective" mental state if the only evidence it hears is that of the prosecution. See id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
176. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
177. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[D]ictum or not, this observation explained our
reasoning [in Martin] and is similarly applicable here.").
178. See it (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he State's right to shift the burden of proving
an affirmitive defense did not include the power to prevent the defendant from attempting to
prove self-defense in an effort to cast doubt on the State's case.").
179. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
180. See id. at 2028-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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makes for allowing evidence of involuntary intoxication indicates that
such evidence is considered relevant and not misleading.' Justice
O'Connor concluded that the sole justification for § 45-2-203 was to
"keep from the jury's consideration a category of evidence that helps
the defendant's case and weakens the government's case. "182
In the second section of her dissent, Justice O'Connor acknowl-
edged the common law's disdain for allowing evidence of voluntary
intoxication." 3 She maintained, however, that during the nine-
teenth century, a significant number of courts recognized that
voluntary intoxication could prevent a defendant from forming the
required mental state."& It was this premise that motivated the
Montana Supreme Court to hold that the "[e] limination of a critical
category of defense evidence precludes a defendant from effectively
rebutting the mental-state element" and that this limitation on the
adversarial process was a due process violation." Justice O'Connor
argued that the failure to acknowledge this significant shift in
doctrine prevented the plurality from performing a complete
"fundamental principle of justice" analysis.' Rather, the analysis
must include the "'fundamental principle' that a defendant has the
right to a fair opportunity to put forward his defense in adversarial
testing."8 7 Justice O'Connor asserted that the shift in common-law
doctrine was a response to this burgeoning right, and that as such, §
45-2-203 was unconstitutional. 18
Finally, the third section of Justice O'Connor's dissent criticized
Justice Ginsburg's contention that § 45-2-203 redefined the mental
181. See id. at 2029 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting) (indicating that bar on evidence of voluntary
intoxication is inconsistent with allowing evidence of involuntary intoxication).
182. i& (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that most permissible evidentiary
restrictions are grounded in issues of reliability. See iUt (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Montana
made no effort tojustify § 45-2-203 on the grounds that the evidence was unreliable, unlike the
states in Chambers and Washington. See iU (O'ConnorJ, dissenting). Rather, the only possible
reason for keeping this evidence out of court was to avoid evidence that "helps the defendant's
case and weakens the government's case." Id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
183. See id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting) (admitting that common-law doctrine was relevant to
examining validity of § 45-2-203).
184. See id. at 2030 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting). Contrary to justice Scalia and tie plurality,
Justice O'Connor gave great weight to the 19th-century shift in allowing evidence of voluntary
intoxication on mental state. See id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated that
the courts realized it was illogical to require a defendant to possess a given mental state, and
then to forbid the defendant from presenting evidence that might defeat arguments on that
subject. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
185. Id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
186. See id. at 2031 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
188. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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state required to convict a person for deliberate homicide. 18 9 The
Montana Supreme Court was clear that obtaining a conviction for
deliberate homicides required proof that the defendant "knowingly
or purposely" committed the crime."9  The court initially deter-
mined that evidence of voluntary intoxication was pertinent to the
requisite mental state.19' The court then made it clear that part of
the prosecution's burden in obtaining a conviction for deliberate
homicide was to show that Egelhoff satisfied "the mental state
element."'9 2  Thus, according to Justice O'Connor, Justice
Ginsburg's determination that § 45-2-203 was constitutional as a
redefinition of a criminal offense was untenable given the Supreme
Court's duty to accept the interpretation of Montana law from
Montana's highest state court.9
In sum, Justice O'Connor determined that the disallowance of
evidence of voluntary intoxication in the past was not enough to
justify such exclusions today."9 Montana created the ban and kept
relevant exculpatory evidence out of the jury's consideration in an
attempt to improve its chances of successful prosecution.195 Al-
though the Court should grant states latitude in administering their
criminal justice systems, "the Court must invalidate those rules that
violate the requirements of due process"'9' under the right to
present a defense; § 45-2-203 is one such rule.
D. Justice Souter's Dissent
The crux of Justice Souter's dissent is similar to that of Justice
O'Connor's. He argued that although states are permitted to
redefine the elements of a crime, no such redefinition had occurred
189. See id. (O'ConnorJ., dissenting) ("Justice Ginsburg's reading of Montana law is plainly
inconsistent with that given by the Montana Supreme Court, and therefore cannot provide a
valid basis to uphold § 45-2-203's operation.").
190. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
191. See idL (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Egelhoff v. State, 900 P.2d 260, 265 (Mont.
1995)).
192. See id (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor cited two parts of the Montana
Supreme Court opinion in support of her conclusion. The first was the conclusion that
evidence of intoxication was relevant to the determination of "knowingly or purposely." See id.
(O'ConnorJ, dissenting) (citing Egdhoff, 900 P.2d at 265). SecondJustice Nelson wrote in his
concurrence that § 45-2-203 excluded relevant evidence that lessened the prosecution's burden
of proving the mental element of deliberate homicide. See id (citing Egelhoff, 900 P.2d at 268
(Nelson, J., concurring)).
193. See id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting) (noting Supreme Court's duty to accept highest state
court's interpretation of state law).
194. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
195. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
196. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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here. 97 Assuming that no redefinition had occurred, Montana still
could limit the use of evidence if justified by valid state interests. 9 ,
Justice Souter conceded that the plurality made a convincing
argument for the rejection of intoxication evidence at common law,
but asserted that the inquiry must include an analysis under the right
to present a defense. 99 The ability of states to limit relevant evi-
dence justifiably tempers this right to present a defense.0 Justice
Souter offered one possiblejustification, namely to preventjury confu-
sion."' Montana failed to assert this or any other justification for
its actions, however, and § 45-2-203 therefore was found unconstitu-
tional.2
Justice Souter also argued that Montana has achieved its desired
end by redefining "knowingly" and "purposely" so as to exclude
evidence of voluntary intoxication.0 3 Under the Court's decision
in Patterson, the wide latitude granted a state in defining its criminal
justice system would permit such a redefinition." 4  As Justices
O'Connor and Breyer noted in their dissents, however, it was impossi-
ble to read § 45-2-203 as having done so, given the decision of the
Montana Supreme Court.0
E. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer wrote the third dissent in Montana v. Egelhoff
Considerably shorter than those of Justices O'Connor and Souter,
Justice Breyer agreed with the other dissenters that § 45-2-203 could
not be read as having redefined the mental element of deliberate
197. See id. at 2032 (SouterJ., dissenting) (stating personal belief that § 45-2-203 redefined
elements of deliberate homicide, but that Montana Supreme Court held that it had not).
198. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
199. See id. at 2032-33 (SouterJ., dissenting) (referring to justice O'Connor's development
of right to present a defense precedent). Justice Souter indicated that the tight to present a
defense included the right to present relevant evidence. See id. at 2033 (Souter,J., dissenting).
200. See id. (SouterJ., dissenting) (stating that Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986),
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973), and Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18.19
(1967), established the right to present relevant evidence absentjustified exclusion by the state).
201. See id. at 2034 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for State of Hawaii et. al., Egelhoff
(No. 95-566)).
202. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
203. See id. at 2033 (SouterJ., dissenting).
204. See id. (SouterJ., dissenting). Justice Souter intimated that a redefinition of"knowingly
and purposely" would not offend In re Winship's requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. See id. (SouterJ., dissenting) (citing In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). The due
process analysis under Winship is dependent on how the state defines the elements of a crime,
see id. (SouterJ., dissenting), and Patterson accords states "broad limits" as to how to define those
elements. See id. (SouterJ., dissenting) (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211, n.12
(1977)).
205. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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homicide." 6 He argued, however, that this was irrelevant to the
constitutionality of the statute; even if § 45-2-203 had redefined the
mental state, it still would be unconstitutional because "it turns guilt
or innocence not upon state of mind, but upon irrelevant external
circumstances."20" If it were the desire of the Montana Legislature
to equate "knowingly or purposely" with voluntary intoxication, then
it should have done so in a more deliberate manner.208 As written,
Justice Breyer believed § 45-2-203 was a constitutional violation. 20 9
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF MONTANA V. EGFLHOFF
Given the substantial acknowledgment by the Court in prior cases
of a due process right to present a defense,210 it is odd that the
Court avoided applying this right,21' and instead applied the "funda-
mental principle ofjustice" standard.212 The facts in Egelhoffcertain-
ly are similar, if not identical, to other cases in which the Court has
analyzed an evidentiary exclusion by determining whether the
rationale underlying the exclusion justifies curtailing a defendant's
right to present a defense. 13 The Court's approach in Egelhoff is all
the more questionable given that the evidentiary bar was absolute;
prior to Egelhoff, the Supreme Court consistently had found complete
bans on reliable and relevant evidence unconstitutional.214
Justice Scalia attempted to limit the applicability of Chambers and
the right to present a defense by characterizing the Chambers decision
as "highly case-specific error correction.2 1 Justice Scalia thus
ascribed great import to Justice Powell's "limitation clause" in
Chambers, which cautioned that the holding did not signal any new
206. See id. at 2035 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
207. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer provided the following example to illustrate
how the statute would pin guilt on "irrelevant" external circumstances:
An intoxicated driver stopped at an intersection who unknowingly accelerated into a
pedestrian would likely be found guilty, for ajury unaware of intoxication would likely
infer knowledge or purpose. An identically intoxicated driver racing along a highway
who unknowingly sideswiped another car would likely be found innocent, for a jury
unaware of intoxication would likely infer negligence.
I& (BreyerJ., dissenting).
208. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
209. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
210. See discussion supra Part I (delineating creation of right to present a defense).
211. See generally discussion supra Part I.B (discussing post-Chambers cases and their treatment
of tight to present a defense).
212. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2017 (plurality opinion).
213. See discussion supra Part I.B (discussing right to present a defense after Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)).
214. See generally discussion supra Part I (detailing right to present a defense).
215. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2022 (plurality opinion).
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constitutional principles.216  Egelhoff is the first case in the twenty-
three years following Chambers in which the Court has seen fit to
invoke the "limitation clause" to circumvent the import of Cham-
bers.2 17 The consistent rejection of the clause by the Supreme Court,
as well as by the U.S. Circuit Courts,218 makes Justice Scalia's charac-
terization of Chambers suspect
The Court accepted the existence of the right to present a defense.
Although the Court may have attempted to downplay Chambers'
importance by citing Justice Powell's statement, it could not ignore
the constitutional right to present a defense. Justice Scalia explicitly
stated that due process does afford protection against restrictions on
"that right."219 As the Court has acknowledged the right to present
a defense and has used this right to invalidate evidentiary restrictions
like that in Egelhoff, why did the Court avoid this simple way of
affirming the Montana Supreme Court's decision? Why did the Court
instead force Egelhoff to show that the narrow right to present
evidence of voluntary intoxication on the issue of mens rea was "so
rooted in traditions and the consciences of our people as to be
ranked fundamental?" 2" There are two reasons, both unavoidably
intertwined: morality andJustice Scalia.221
Justice Scalia has made it clear that his approach to fundamental
right inquiries under the Due Process Clause requires that the right
be "historically and traditionally protected. '222 He also has made it
clear that the right examined should be narrowly defined, stating,
"We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition
protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified."2  The combination of Justice Scalia's two requirements
216. See id. at 2023 (plurality opinion).
217. See discussion supra part I.B (noting post-Chambers treatment of right to present a
defense). In fact, the Court in Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986), specifically attempted to
alleviate any affect that the "limitation clause" may have on the right to present a defense,
stating: "We break no new ground in observing that an essential component of procedural
fairness is an opportunity to be heard." Id. at 690.
218. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text (discussing treatment of Chambers by
federal circuit courts).
219. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2017 (plurality opinion).
220. Id. (plurality opinion).
221. See Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and the Privatization of ReUgion, 41 CATH. U. L.
REv. 19, 77 (1991) ("According to Justice Scalia, the state is permitted to act upon moral
judgments."); see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 574 (1991) (Scalia,J., concurring)
(agreeing with majority decision on grounds that statute reflected traditional moral belief that
no one should expose his naked body in public).
222. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) ("In an attempt to limit and guide
interpretation of the [Due Process Clause], we have insisted not merely that the interest
denominated as a 'liberty' be 'fundamental,' but that it be an interest traditionally protected by
our society.").
223. Id. at 127 n.6.
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assures that this "test" will not provide any constraints on the
judiciary 24 and will allow courts to pass moral judgments on
constitutional issues.2
Justice Scalia first requires that the right be traditionally protected.
If the judge defines the relevant tradition, then there is little to
prevent "personal and private notions" from dictating how that
tradition is defined.226 It then is very likely that the jurist will allow
his or her personal morality to influence how to define the tradi-
tion. 27 This is especially dangerous because Justice Scalia's ap-
proach relies solely on tradition in determining whether a right
exists. 228 This is in sharp contrast to other approaches that recog-
nize the relevance of tradition but do not make it the sole criteri-
on.229  Because a jurist's definition of tradition depends largely on
personal and private notions, Justice Scalia's exclusive focus on
tradition ensures that his approach will serve as an illusory limitation
on the judiciary.2 °
Justice Scalia's choice of generality in defining the right to be
examined further illustrates the pretextual nature of his test. It is
virtually impossible for a justice sitting today to define accurately or
to understand the traditions of another era.231  Additionally, it is
highly likely that jurists attempting to reconstruct the past will be
shaded by "their own world view."232  There is an inherent danger
224. SeeEdward Gary Spitko, Note, A Critique ofJusticeAntonin Scalia'sApproach to Fundamental
Rights Adjudication, 1990 DUKE LJ. 1337,1339 (concluding that test does not achieve an objective
limitation on courts' discretion).
225. See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorff, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights,
57 U. CHI. L REV. 1057, 1098 (1990) ("It is a construct to be deployed selectively, allowing
judges to define rights more or less abstractly depending upon their own views ....").
226. See Spitko, supra note 224, at 1349 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 519
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting)).
227. See id.; see also Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of
Justices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25, 27-28 (1994) (indicating that textualist approach will
fall because human nature dictates that "moral experience" will affect legal conclusions); Tribe
& Dorff, supra note 225, at 1059 (arguing thatJustices of Supreme Court cannot avoid influences
of personal feelings (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 61 (1990))).
Justice Scalia acknowledges that legal opinions unavoidably reflect the morality of the jurist.
SeeAntonin Scalia, Morality, Pragmatism, and the Legal Order, 9 HARV.J.L & PUB. POLY 123, 123
(1986) ("One would be foolish to deny the relevance of moral perceptions to law.").
228. See Spitko, supra note 224, at 1349 (arguing that Justice Scalia's approach hinges
protection as fundamental right purely on existence of tradition).
229. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 140 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(asserting that plurality failed to acknowledge reasons for limiting place of tradition "in
interpreting the Constitution's deliberately capricious language").
230. See Spitko, supra note 224, at 1349.
231. See id. at 1350-51 (arguing that traditions are hard to define because morals and beliefs
that shaped those traditions reflect social environment of that time and will change).
232. It. at 1351; see also Tribe & Dorff, supra note 225, at 1087 (stating that definition of
tradition requires value judgments). Justice Scalia has ackowledged this very fact, admitting that
"[originalism] requires.., immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the
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then in basing a constitutional test in tradition because of the high
risk that the judge will characterize that right incorrectly. This risk is
increased by requiring a narrow definition of tradition because
broader principles most assuredly are easier to identify and apply.3
An examination of Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald
D.2" is illustrative. There the Court addressed the claim that due
process protected an interest in the relationship between a father and
child.23 Justice Scalia required Michael H. to show that the interest
in a parental relationship was "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."2" More
importantly, Justice Scalia narrowed the asserted right to that between
an adulterous father and his illegitimate child. 7 Relying on a
common-law tradition that protected father-child relationships but did
not provide specifically the same protection for adulterous fathers and
their children, the plurality rejected Michael H.'s claim. 238
In a strong dissent, Justice Brennan assailed Justice Scalia's
analytical approach. 239  First, Justice Brennan labeled the depen-
dence on tradition as a pretense, arguing that the concept was not an
objective restraint because "tradition" is a nebulous term. 240 A
related problem with the plurality's reliance on tradition was Justice
Scalia's mandate for a narrow definition of the examined right.241
The right at issue was not the one the plurality explored, but rather,
whether the adulterous father-child relationship fell under the
protection of the more general due process safeguards for
parent-child relationships.242 Toward that end, critics of the Michael
time-somehow placing out of mind knowledge that we have which an earlier age did not, and
putting on beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are not those of our day."
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evi4 57 U. QN. L. REv. 849, 856-57 (1989).
233. See Spitko, supra note 224, at 1352 ("[T]he broader tradition can be stated with
confidence, whereas the narrower 'traditions' are uncertain.").
234. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
235. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 119.
236. Id. at 125.
237. See id. at 126-27.
238. See id. at 124-27.
239. See id. at 136-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
240. See id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
241. See id. at 141-42 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (arguing thatJustice Scalia's characterization
of asserted right was unnecessary because case does not present Court with new kind of interest;
based on precedent, parent-child relationship clearly is a constitutional liberty).
242. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting); ef. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting that case was not about fundamental right to engage in
homosexual activity as framed by majority, but about broader "right to be left alone").
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H. decision have argued that the plurality's analysis allowed Justice
Scalia to base the holding in morality.'
Such is the case with Montana v. Egelhoff Justice Scalia applied the
narrow fundamental tradition approach to uphold the constitutional-
ity of § 45-2-203 on moral grounds. The common-law history of
voluntary intoxication evidence that Justice Scalia relied on evinced
a clear moral reprobation of intoxicated defendants. 244 Justice
Scalia attempted to justify reliance on the common law with more
practical rationales, such as the propensity of intoxication evidence to
mislead juries ' and the ban's role in deterring intoxicated
crimes; 246 but these justifications are simply false. It is the third
justification that forms the basis of the decision: statutes like §
45-2-203 codify a moral disdain for intoxicated defendants.247
Similarly illustrative ofJustice Scalia's moral reasoning in Egelhoff is
his characterization of the right to be examined: the defendant must
show that the right to present evidence of voluntary intoxication on
the issue of mens rea is a fundamental principle of justice.241 This
formulation of the issue is too literal. By defining the right so
narrowly, Justice Scalia makes the Due Process Clause a rigid doctrine
unable to adapt to changes in society.249 The fact that eighty
percent of the states have abandoned the common-law doctrine used
to justify the ban illustrates the unworkability of Justice Scalia's
approach.
243. See Myers, supra note 221, at 76 (stating thatJustice Scalia's analysis will find legislation
based on moral tradition constitutional). See generally Elizabeth A. Hadad, Comment, Tradition
and the Liberty Interest: Circumscribing the Rights of the NaturalFather, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 291 (1990)
(assailing morally motivated decision in Michael H.).
244. SeeMontana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct 2013, 2017-20 (1996) (plurality opinion) (detailing
common-law history of voluntary intoxication evidence).
245. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (assailingJustice Scalia's assertion that such
evidence misleads juries).
246. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (refuting Justice Scalia's contention that
statutes such as § 45-2-203 will deter future crimes involving intoxication).
247. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (criticizing reliance on morality for upholding
constitutionality of § 45-2-203).
248. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct at 2017 (plurality opinion).
249. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,543 (1961) (Harlan,J., dissenting) ("[The Due Process
Clause] is not a series of isolated points .... It is a rational continuum which ... includes a
freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints and which also
recognizes ... that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs
asserted tojustify their abridgment.") (citations omitted); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
141 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Construing the Fourteenth Amendment to offer shelter only
to those interests specifically protected by historical practice... ignores the kind of society in
which our Constitution exists. We are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a
facilitative, pluralistic one ...."); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.), 316, 415
(1819) ("The Constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affhirs.").
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This substantial shift is a strong indication that the reasons for the
common-law tradition no longer are applicable. Quite simply, social
mores have changed. For example, there is a large disparity in the
scientific and psychological understanding of intoxication today than
during the common-law period Justice Scalia relied upon.210 It is
unnecessary for a contemporary jurist to rely on the knowledge and
social stigmas of an age long gone, especially when those factors have
changed substantially and are no longer relevant.
21
The relevant fundamental right here is the right to present a
defense.252 As such, the "fundamental principle of justice" test has
no place in Egelhoff. The Court erred by abandoning the analysis
applied in cases such as Crane v. Kentucky,2 3 and in the process,
incorrectly overturned the Montana Supreme Court on primarily
moral grounds. The question then becomes whether Egelhoff harmed
the right to present a defense doctrine.
The answer is no. The Court essentially was forced to apply the
analysis common to right to present a defense precedent. The Court
purported to apply the Patterson test, requiring Egelhoff to show that
the right to consider intoxication evidence in determining mental
state is a fundamental one, and concluded that he failed to show it as
a fundamental right.2' But the plurality was forced to acknowledge
that the exclusion of such evidence was not fundamental.255
In applying the test used in right to present defense cases, the
plurality attempted to justify its adherence to the common-law
principles. 6 By suggesting that the relevancy and quality of intoxi-
cation evidence should be weighed against the state's justifications for
excluding the evidence, the Court added Egelhoff to the growing list
of decisions endorsing the balancing test for cases involving the right
to a defense.
250. See supra notes 128-3O and accompanying text (discussing state of knowledge concerning
intoxication); cf MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 140 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (maintaining thatJustice
Scalia's approach ignored modem day ability to identify father concretely with blood tests that
were not available during time of common law).
251. See Tribe & Dorff, supra note 225, at 1090 (arguing that weakness in Justice Scalia's
approach is its inability to reject inapplicable historical traditions).
252. Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter agreed with this assertion, stating that the Court
should have addressed the right to present a defense. Seegelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2031 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); id. at 1032 (Souter,J., dissenting).
253. 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
254. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2021 (plurality opinion).
255. See id,. at 2018-20 (plurality opinion) (recognizing shift toward allowing intoxication
evidence in analysis of defendant's mental state).
256. See id. at 2020-21 (plurality opinion) (specifying policy rationales in favor of evidentiary
exclusion); see also supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (refuting posited justifications).
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The reliance on fairly weak justifications, however, does not bode
well for future application of the doctrine. If the Court is willing to
accept ad hoc rationalizations257 based on less than plausible
evidence in upholding statutes such as Montana's,"8 then it is
difficult to see how future defendants will be able to convince courts
that the exclusion of evidence in their situations was justifiable. It is
likely that the Court gave § 45-2-203 an added presumption of
constitutionality because of its moral ramifications. The Court may
not be so quick to accept ad hoc justifications with other evidentiary
issues.
The most telling sign that the right to present a defense doctrine
did not suffer severely in Egelhoff is the sharp division between the
Justices. An analysis of'Justice Ginsburg's concurrence shows that this
easily could have been a 4-3 plurality finding a due process violation.
Justice Ginsburg wrote that if § 45-2-203 amounted to a limitation on
relevant evidence with respect to the mens rea, then the statute would
be unconstitutional.259 Justice Ginsburg's belief that the statute was
constitutional rested on the notion that § 45-2-203 redefined the mens
rea of deliberate homicide and that this was well within the bounds
of permissible legislative activity.2 °  Although Justice Ginsburg is
correct that Montana may define deliberate homicide as it pleases, it
is difficult to accept her assertion that this was what Montana had
done. As Justices O'Connor,261 Souter,262 and Breyer each ar-
gued in their respective dissents, the Montana Supreme Court
determined that § 45-2-203 did not redefine the mental elements of
the crime, as Justice Ginsburg mistakenly believed. 2 4 Given that the
257. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2020 n.3 (plurality opinion) (refuting Justice Souter's
contention that the state's lawyers should have offered policyjustifications for § 45-2-203 so that
it would be upheld). Although Justice Scalia's points are well taken,Justice Souter illuminates
a source of concern in the analysis of Egelhoffas it pertains to the right to a defense. Assuming
that future courts adopt Egelhoffas an endorsement of the balancing test in analyzing evidentiary
exclusions, they should not to be too liberal in creating justifications or, for that matter, in
accepting those that are put forth by the state.
258. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (refutingJustice Scalia's justifications for
barring evidence of intoxication).
259. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
260. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
261. See id. at 2031 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
262. See id. at 2032 (Souter, J., dissenting).
263. See id. at 2035 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
264. The Montana Supreme Court wrote that evidence of intoxication was relevant to the
mens rea terms in the definition of deliberate homicide. See State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 265
(Mont. 1995), revtd, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996). In additionJustice Nelson wrote in his concurrence
that by adopting § 45-2-203, the Montana Legislature reduced the state's burden in proving
beyond a reasonable doubt the mental element of the crime. See id. at 268 (Nelson, J.,
concurring). The combination of these statements would seem to suggest that the Montana
Supreme Court did not find that § 45-2-203 redefined the definition of deliberate homicide by
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U.S. Supreme Court is bound by the Montana Supreme Court's
interpretation of its own laws,2  Justice Ginsburg's position that the
statute was nothing more than a legislative redefinition of deliberate
homicide is untenable. Thus, her statement that she would find
constitutional fault with an evidentiary exclusion indicates that the
Court could have affirmed the Montana Supreme Court's determina-
tion that § 45-2-203 infringed Egelhoffs right to present a defense.
Given this precarious balance between overruling and affirming,
Egelhoff may be an anomaly in the jurisprudence of the right to
present a defense.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Courts should be wary of using Montana v. Egelhoff as precedent in
cases involving the right to present a defense. The plurality's failure
to recognize the standards established in case law under the right to
present a defense doctrine is dangerous. Specifically, courts should
be wary of applying the Patterson test instead of the balancing test.
Requiring a defendant to show that the evidence in question invokes
a fundamental principle ofjustice effectively upholds the exclusion of
that evidence, distorts precedent, and allows the judge's personal
morality to dictate the outcome. This inquiry ignores the rationale of
Chambers and the right to present a defense: the adversarial process
functions best when the jury hears relevant and reliable evidence.
Accordingly, courts should continue to analyze evidentiary exclusions
under the balancing test and allow such evidence to be presented
when it is probative.Y
Courts also should be careful not to rely on Justice Scalia'sjustifica-
tions for excluding intoxication evidence because they are highly
suspect and are subject to scrutiny. Medical and legal experts
generally agree that intoxication evidence is reliable and does not
mislead juries.267 Absent the moral belief that such evidence should
be kept out of court, there is little support for the notion that
intoxication evidence is any less important than evidence of insanity
removing the mens rea terms.
265. See Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 488
(1976) ("We are, of course, bound to accept the interpretation of [state] law by the highest
court of the State.").
266. See Young v. Kernan, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17646, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 1996)
(analyzing claim that exclusion of tape recorded police interrogation violated Due Process
Clause). The court acknowledged the "fundamental principle ofjustice" standard of Egehoff,
but applied the balancing test. See id. The court ultimately concluded that the state's interest
in excluding the interrogation outweighed the need to admit the evidence. See id.
267. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing reliability of intoxication and
potential to confuse juries).
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or other potentially confusing issues, which is admissible in trials.2"a
The Court's treatment of alcohol and intoxication is a regrettable
affirmation of the law's inability to recognize that which society openly
acknowledges. Courts should be encouraged to accept evidence of
the mental and physiological effects of alcohol. In that way, the law
can move past the moral issues surrounding alcohol and address the
more important issue of how alcohol can affect the mental state of a
defendant.
Undoubtedly, the debate over the merits of allowing intoxication
evidence to show that a defendant failed to develop the mental
requirements of a crime will rage on long after the effects of Montana
v. Egelhoff have subsided. The Montana Supreme Court already has
declined to review the issues raised in Egelhoff.269 Additionally, the
Egelhoff decision already has begun to appear in court decisions across
the country. 7° The most widespread repercussion of Engelhoff may
268. See New Mexico v. Brown, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 458, at *25-26 (N.M. Dec. 5, 1996) (stating
that intoxication evidence presents same potential concerns as other exculpatory evidence and
that jury should decide weight of evidence).
269. See Byers v. Mahoney, No. 96-258, 1996 Mont. LEXIS 132, at *7-8 (Mont.July 16, 1996)
(refusing to accept Byers' request that court reaffirm its decision in Egelhoff on adequate and
independent state grounds).
It is interesting that the Montana Supreme Court indicated that it "will not go quietly into
that good night." Id. at *8. In rejecting Byers' request to accept the Supreme Court's finding
of unconstitutionality, the court stated that its conclusion in Egelhoff would not apply
retroactively, making it irrelevant to Byers' due process claim. See id The Montana Supreme
Court did reserve the right to reaffirm its decision in Egeihoff. See id. The court quoted itself
in stating that it refused to follow blindly the decisions of the Supreme Court when
"constitutional issues are concerned, even if the applicable state constitution provisions are
identical or nearly identical to those of the United States Constitution." See id., at *8 (citing
State v.Johnson, 719 P.2d 1248, 1254 (Mont. 1986)). The court also stated that its refusal to
review Egelhoff in light of the Supreme Court decision did not "preclude our review of Egelhoff
on adequate and independent state grounds under the appropriate circumstances." Id at *9.
270. The Seventh Circuit recently relied on Egelhoff in rejecting a due process claim involving
ajury instruction under Indiana law. SeeMelendez v. Parke, No. 95-2332, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
20390, at *5-6 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 1996). Melendez claimed thatJury Instruction No. 13, issued
at his trial, violated his "right to present the jury with his defense that, due to voluntary
intoxication, he lacked intent to commit murder." Id at *3. The instruction stated that under
Indiana law, voluntary intoxication was not a defense to a crime, but that if the evidence
suggested that voluntary intoxication prevented Melendez from forming the intent necessary
under the definition of the crime, the jury should find him innocent of murder. See id. The
Supreme Court of Indiana determined that the instruction was incorrect, but not such that it
misled the jury. See id at *3-4.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed this decision. See id. at *9. The court relied exclusively on
Egelhoff in rejecting Melendez's claim that the instruction denied him the due process right to
present a defense. See id at *5-6. The court argued that even if the trial court had instructed
the jury that voluntary intoxication was not a defense and that voluntary intoxication could not
be considered in relation to the formation of intent, there was no due process violation in light
of Egelhoff. See i. at *6. Although it appears from the facts of the case that the Seventh Circuit
also relied heavily on the weakness of Melendez's case in arguing that he did not possess the
required intent, see id. at *8-9, the use of Egelhoff here is disturbing because the court is
addressing a state law that allows evidence of intoxication in determining mental state. Thus,
it appears initially that the Ege/hoffdecision may affect vicariously those states who allow voluntary
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be a trend among state legislatures to enact similar statutes, given that
the decision has opened the door to easier convictions for defendants
who were intoxicated at the time of the crime.
The effect of Egeihoffon the right to present a defense doctrine will
be dearer as courts begin to invoke its holding. The slim margin by
which the Montana statute was ruled constitutional, the distortion of
precedent, and the fairly mild attack on the right to present a defense
doctrine will mitigate Egelhoff s effect. Egelhoff is more indicative of an
agreement with the moral condemnation of an intoxicated defendant
than of a growing dissatisfaction with a defendant's due process right
to present a defense.27 Thus, Montana v. Egelhoff may prove to be
only a footnote in the seemingly ever-evolving constitutional right to
present a defense doctrine.
intoxication evidence. It allows courts to justify suspect limitations or restrictions on the use of
voluntary intoxication in states in which such evidence is permissible under law. See, e.g., Geiger
v. Morton, No. 95-5290, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9058, at *11 (D.NJ.June 24, 1996) (citing Egelhoff
for support of "fundamental principles" test in rejecting claim that court denied due process by
denying defense of pathological intoxication);'Missouri v. Copeland, 928 S.W.2d 828, 837 (Mo.
1996) (employing Egelhoffto support contention that due process does not guarantee admission
of all relevant evidence in refuting claim that it was due process violation to exclude
psychologist's testimony on battered spouse syndrome).
271. See Indiana v. VanCleave, 674 N.E.2d 1293, 1302 n.15 (Ind. 1996) (limiting holding of
Egelhoff to premise that "Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require
states to allow voluntary intoxication as a defense").
1288
